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In Defense of Immutability
Nicholas Serafin*
Over the last forty years, the concept of immutability has been central
to Equal Protection doctrine. According to current doctrine, a trait is
immutable if it is beyond the power of an individual to change or if it
is fundamental to personal identity. A trait that meets either of these
criteria receives heightened legal protection under constitutional
antidiscrimination law. Yet most legal scholars who have addressed the
topic have called for the abandonment of the immutability criterion on the
grounds that the immutability criterion is conceptually confused, morally
indefensible, and bound to stigmatize subordinate groups.
A rejection of the immutability criterion is unwarranted. The
immutability criterion must be understood as targeting social, as opposed
to personal, identities. In this Article, I introduce work from social
psychology and sociology to unpack the concept of social identity. I show
that stigmatized individuals are denied access to high-status groups,
institutions, relationships, and occupations because of their immutable
social identities. I conclude that, for Equal Protection doctrine, it
is entirely irrelevant whether “immutable” traits are physically
unchangeable or are part of an individual’s personal identity.
After defending this “social” conception of immutability, I show that
social immutability ties together a number of threads running throughout
antidiscrimination law, namely, animus and stigma jurisprudence under
the Fourteenth Amendment and the “badges of slavery” reading of the
Thirteenth Amendment. I then demonstrate how the social conception of
immutability extends antidiscrimination protection to signifiers
associated with gender expression, culture, and ethnicity.

*I could not have completed this project without the support of Elizabeth Anderson and
Richard Primus. I would also like to thank Scott Hershovitz, Don Herzog, Derrick Darby,
Peter Railton, Gabriel Mendlow, Norman Daniels, Ira Lindsay, and audiences at the 2018
meeting of the Politics, Philosophy, and Economics Society, at Boston University School of
Law, and at Santa Clara University School of Law. I would also like to thank the editors
of the BYU Law Review for their insightful feedback.
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INTRODUCTION
In Obergefell v. Hodges, Justice Kennedy observes that
homosexuality is “both a normal expression of human sexuality
and immutable.”1 Because homosexuality is immutable, Kennedy
argues that same-sex marriage is the only recourse for gay
individuals who seek the “profound commitment” that marriage
offers.2 Kennedy does not define immutability, nor does he explain
why immutability is relevant to Equal Protection. Nevertheless, his
statement places Obergefell squarely within a class of cases that,
over the past fifty years, has dramatically expanded the scope of
antidiscrimination law.3 If Obergefell is any indication, the concept
of immutability continues to play a substantial role in the Court’s
Equal Protection analysis.
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015).
2. Id. at 2594.
3. See infra Part I.
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At the same time, immutability is a perennial target of scholarly
criticism. The immutability criterion has been attacked as, among
other things, conceptually confused, over-inclusive, underinclusive, irrelevant, and stigmatizing.4 As Kenji Yoshino argued
decades ago, “academic commentary seems univocal in calling for
[the immutability criterion’s] retirement.”5 More recent scholarship
has largely borne out Yoshino’s observation.6 Indeed, since
Obergefell, calls to abandon the immutability criterion have
continued apace.7
There are good reasons to resist such calls. First, it is hard
to deny that wrongful discrimination most often targets individuals
on the basis of individual traits that are deeply difficult to
change. As an analytical tool for understanding and addressing
wrongful discrimination, the immutability criterion thus is roughly
on the right track. Moreover, it is doubtful that legal scholars have
identified a suitable replacement for the immutability criterion;
in fact, some proposals seem bound to raise even thornier
problems.8 Yet abandoning the immutability criterion without
a suitable replacement would dramatically weaken Equal
Protection doctrine.
The immutability criterion should not be rejected, but it must
be revised. In this Article, I propose a new conception of
immutability, which I call “social immutability.” As I discuss in
Part I, legal scholars and jurists have traditionally conceived of
immutability as referring to individual traits that are physically or
4. See infra Sections I.B and I.C.
5. See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption
and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108 YALE L.J. 485, 518 (1998) (citations omitted);
Susan R. Schmeiser, Changing the Immutable, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1497, 1511 (2008) (observing
that “[s]cholars argued convincingly in the 1990s that courts should discard immutability as
a requirement for heightened scrutiny, compiling instances where courts already had done
so”) (citations omitted); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 118–22 (2010) (arguing that “the legal notion of
immutability is confused”).
6. See Schmeiser, supra note 5.
7. See Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2 (2015).
8. Compare, e.g., id. (arguing that the immutability criterion ought to be rejected in
favor of expanded Title VII remedies such as statutory disparate impact standards) with
Richard Primus, Of Visible Race-Consciousness and Institutional Role: Equal Protection and
Disparate Impact After Ricci and Inclusive Communities, in TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
AFTER 50 YEARS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 67TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
LABOR 295 (2015) (noting that statutory disparate-impact standards are likely to survive only
“in partly truncated form, as compared to what they once were”).
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psychologically unchangeable. By contrast, according to the social
conception of immutability, courts should not attempt to identify
traits that are immutable in either sense. Instead, courts should
focus on the immutability of particular social signifiers. As I explain
below, a social signifier is any observable property or relation
commonly used to sort individuals into different social groups.9
Traits associated with race or sex are social signifiers in this sense.
But many other properties and relations may also signify group
membership, including hairstyle, gender expression, language, and
much else.10 On the social conception of immutability, a signifier
satisfies the immutability criterion when it possesses a low social
status that persists throughout various social and political domains,
regardless of the underlying nature of the signifier in question.11
In Part II, I unpack the social conception of immutability. The
social conception of immutability comprises two components: a
descriptive account of trait-based discrimination and a normative
account of Equal Protection. In Section II.A, I introduce the
empirical work that underlies the descriptive account of trait-based
discrimination. This work indicates that in settings characterized
by group inequality individuals will tend to be assigned to high- or
low-status social groups on the basis of observable signifiers.
9. Describing human traits in terms of their semiotic functions naturally calls to mind
Ferdinand de Saussure’s analysis of language systems in terms of the “signifier” and the
“signified” as well as Charles Sanders Peirce’s analysis of signs in terms of the “object,” and
the “interpretant.” See, respectively, FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL
LINGUISTICS 65–67 (2011) and CHARLES S. PEIRCE, THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE, VOLUME 2, 478
(Peirce Edition Project ed., 1998). Though my account of human traits as signifiers loosely
draws upon these bodies of work, the social conception of immutability does not presuppose
any particular account of language, sign systems, or signification.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. While my view is novel, it is not entirely without precedent. See, e.g., Samuel
Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 681 (2001) (arguing that
because immutable characteristics are “socially constructed,” the immutability criterion
ought to cover characteristics “experienced by individuals within [a] culture as immutable”).
By contrast, my account is concerned with ascriptive social identities, not with first-personal,
subjective experience. Moreover, I do not claim that all characteristics that fall under the
immutability criterion are socially constructed. See infra Section II.A. Richard Ford offers an
account of “socially immutable” characteristics. See RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL
CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 102 (2005). However, my account differs significantly in that I offer an
empirical account of the social processes that generate immutable characteristics and defend
changes to Equal Protection that Ford opposes. See infra Section IV.B. Finally, Jack Balkin
connects immutability to status and stable social meaning. See J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of
Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313 (1997). His work, however, predates important doctrinal
developments that my view explains and justifies.
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Often these signifiers will be very difficult to change; however, this
will not necessarily be true of all such signifiers. It is more apt to
think of certain social signifiers as “fixed,” in the sense that—
regardless of their biological or psychological bases and regardless
of how difficult they are to change—these signifiers possess a stable
social meaning in a variety of social and political settings. When
a social signifier possesses a stable social meaning, individuals
who bear the signifier can be reliably identified as belonging to a
high- or low-status group. Low-status individuals will then face
discrimination on the basis of the low-status social signifiers that
they bear.
I then discuss, in Section II.B, the normative principles
underlying the social conception of immutability. Drawing on
recent developments in moral philosophy, I argue that relational
egalitarianism provides a compelling normative basis for the
immutability criterion. For relational egalitarians, justice requires
that the state work to disestablish unjust group hierarchies.
Relational egalitarianism thus shares much conceptual overlap
with Equal Protection doctrine, which has long been construed as
forbidding class and caste hierarchy.12 While relational egalitarians
have not focused specifically on legal doctrine, relational
egalitarian insights are directly relevant to the immutability debate.
For example, relational egalitarian arguments suggest that, for the
purposes of Equal Protection analysis, it is largely irrelevant
whether immutable traits are biological or psychological in origin,
or whether they are due strictly to accidents of birth or involve
individual choice in some respect. Rather, on this view, a social
signifier warrants protection under the immutability criterion
when it is associated with low-status groups and is used to deny
members of low-status groups access to material resources or highstatus institutions, relationships, and occupations.
In the remainder of the Article, I consider the relationship
between the social conception of immutability and legal doctrine.
In Part III, I argue that social immutability is consonant with
existing Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. In
a number of areas—specifically, animus and stigma jurisprudence
12. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
291, 314 (2007) (citing the anti-caste arguments of the Joint House-Senate Committee
on Reconstruction, whose members drafted the Fourteenth Amendment); see also infra
Section II.B.
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under the Fourteenth Amendment and the “badges of slavery”
reading of the Thirteenth Amendment—Equal Protection requires
that courts extend special solicitude to easily identifiable, lowstatus social groups. The social conception of immutability
similarly directs courts to pay particular attention to the ways in
which members of low-status groups are wrongfully singled out.
One virtue of the social conception of immutability is that it
provides a unified account of these seemingly disparate aspects of
Constitutional antidiscrimination law.
Finally, in Part IV, I show how the social conception of
immutability resolves existing controversies within Equal
Protection doctrine surrounding gender expression, hair, and
language. By relying on the traditional understanding of
immutability, courts have issued a series of conflicting and
confused rulings in each of these areas. The social conception of
immutability, by contrast, provides a coherent rationale for
extending Fourteenth Amendment protection to individuals who
face discrimination on the basis of these signifiers. Overall, I
demonstrate in the latter half of this Article that the social
conception of immutability is central to understanding the past and
shaping the future of antidiscrimination law.
I. THE IMMUTABILITY CRITERION
In this Part, I discuss the origins and development of the
immutability criterion. The Court has never offered a complete
definition of immutability, and scholars have offered a variety of
reconstructive accounts. Additionally, the immutability criterion
has evolved over time to incorporate multiple factors. It is therefore
helpful to think of contemporary immutability as a synthesis of two
distinct standards, which I shall refer to as “old” immutability and
“new” immutability.13
A. Old Immutability
The Court first sets forth the immutability criterion in Frontiero
v. Richardson.14 In Frontiero, a married female Air Force officer
sought to obtain for her husband and for herself various

13. This framing follows Clarke, supra note 7, at 13–27.
14. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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government benefits, which required the officer to claim her
husband as a “dependent.”15 Under federal law, a married
serviceman could claim his wife as a dependent without providing
proof of her dependence, whereas a married servicewoman could
only claim her husband as a dependent after proving that he in fact
relied upon her for over half of his financial support. In defense of
the law, the military argued that, because wives are much more
often financially dependent upon their husbands, it would be
administratively convenient to require only servicewomen to prove
the dependence of their partners.16
Holding that the law constituted unconstitutional
discrimination against servicewomen, the Court explains:
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the
imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular
sex because of their sex would seem to violate “the basic concept
of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility.”17

The Court here characterizes sex as immutable by virtue of its
similarity to race. But this simply raises further questions: How
does the Court understand race? And in which respects, in the
Court’s view, is sex like race?
Perhaps, in the Court’s view, race and sex are alike in that traits
associated with race or sex are biologically heritable and
unchangeable. Immutability, on this interpretation, would refer to
biologically heritable and unchangeable traits. However, there are
two problems with this reading. First, it is unclear at best that
American courts historically have viewed race as biologically
heritable. Certainly, the theory of hypodescent undergirding
various state racial classifications—from Tennessee’s “one drop”
rule to Virginia’s one-fourth rule—indicated that some legislators
considered race to be in some sense biologically heritable.18 Yet
throughout the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth
century, courts generally avoided endorsing a strictly biological

15. Id. at 678.
16. Id. at 688.
17. Id. at 686 (citation omitted).
18. See generally Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the
One-Drop Rule, 1600–1860, 91 MINN. L. REV. 592 (2006).
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account of race.19 Instead, it was often left to local institutions and
local actors to define and enforce racial categories.20 Courts
“consistently held that juries . . . should have great discretion in
finding the ‘facts’ of race,” which included an individual’s
behavior, dress, and social associates.21 Thus, if we are to rely on
the Court’s historical understanding of race, immutability does not
necessarily refer to biologically heritable traits.
Second, national origin, alienage, and illegitimacy are also
among the class of immutable traits that trigger heightened
scrutiny.22 National origin, alienage, and illegitimacy, however,
are plainly not biologically heritable. Rather, these traits are matters
of social and political fact. By contrast, the Court has refused to
grant protected class status to other traits, such as certain forms of
mental disability, that at least in some cases are biologically
heritable.23 As Cass Sunstein has pointed out, it seems that
biological heritability is neither necessary nor sufficient for meeting
the immutability criterion.24
Perhaps instead the Frontiero Court simply means that an
immutable trait is a trait that is, for whatever reason, impossible to
shed. This, at least, is how Justice Brennan casts immutability in
later cases. In Bakke, for example, Brennan claims that an immutable
trait is simply a trait that an individual is “powerless to escape or
set aside.”25 Yet note that the Frontiero Court’s definition of
immutability also includes explicitly normative criteria. According
to the Frontiero Court, discrimination on the basis of an immutable
trait violates the principle that “legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility.”26 Discrimination on the
19. See Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375 (1999).
20. Id. at 1381.
21. Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the NineteenthCentury South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 117–33 (1998).
22. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (noting that “the presumption of
statutory validity may also be undermined when a State has enacted legislation creating
classes based upon certain other immutable human attributes,” including national origin,
alienage, and illegitimacy) (citations omitted).
23. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (refusing to
recognize the mentally disabled as a “quasi-suspect class”).
24. Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2443 (1994).
25. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
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basis of race or sex is unfair, on this view, because such
discrimination burdens individuals on the basis of traits that they
did not choose to adopt. Of course, whether an individual should
be held responsible for possessing a particular trait has no bearing
upon whether the trait itself is impossible to change. The former
question concerns moral or legal norms, whereas the latter concerns
the nature of the trait itself. A coherent understanding of
immutability therefore must make sense of both the empirical and
the normative criteria that indicate for the Court whether a
particular trait satisfies the immutability criterion.
According to the old immutability criterion, then, a trait is
immutable if it meets two conditions. First, the trait must be such
that an individual is powerless to escape it or set it aside. Second,
an individual must bear no moral responsibility for possessing the
trait; the trait must be, in the language of Frontiero, an “accident of
birth.”27 As the Frontiero Court notes, this second condition reflects
a moral concern, namely, that individuals should not be burdened
on the basis of traits that they did not choose and cannot change.
B. Against Old Immutability
In the decades after Frontiero, legal scholars advanced a number
of influential criticisms of old immutability. As these criticisms are
by now fairly well known, I shall only briefly canvas their main
points. It is important to survey these criticisms, however, because,
as I discuss below, while courts responded by adopting a new
conception of immutability, it is doubtful that the new conception
of immutability is a sufficient corrective.
According to Kenji Yoshino, old immutability is “both overand underinclusive.”28 It is overinclusive because “it is impossible
for society to operate without discriminating on the basis of some
immutable characteristics.”29 For example, suppose that height or
intelligence are immutable characteristics. If immutable traits
deserve protection, then the immutability criterion requires that
Courts submit to heightened scrutiny legislation that differentially
affects individuals on the basis of height or intelligence. Yet this is
an implausible conception of the Equal Protection principle.
27. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
28. See Yoshino, supra note 5, at 504.
29. Id.
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Whereas Equal Protection has traditionally been understood as
forbidding “caste and class” legislation, individuals who differ in
height or intelligence do not inhabit separate castes or classes. More
broadly, expanding the scope of Equal Protection to all immutable
traits—as the immutability criterion seemingly requires—risks
opening the floodgates to new Equal Protection claims.
In Frontiero, the Court acknowledges this point, suggesting that
some immutable characteristics, such as intelligence or physical
disability, do not receive protection because, unlike race or sex,
intelligence and physical disability may be relevant to job
performance or to one’s ability to contribute to society.30 As John
Hart Ely pointed out, however, this suggests that immutability is
not actually a factor in the Court’s Equal Protection analysis; rather,
it is relevance to legislative purpose that is truly important for
determining when legislation wrongfully burdens a particular class
of individuals.31 The Frontiero Court’s answer to the
overinclusiveness objection, in other words, effectively vitiates
immutability as a component of Equal Protection analysis.
According to the underinclusiveness objection, the
immutability criterion rests on the assumption that “legislation is
less problematic if it burdens groups that can assimilate into
mainstream society by either converting or passing.”32 That is, the
immutability criterion seemingly permits wrongful discrimination
against individuals or groups, so long as these individuals or
groups are able to hide or shed their distinctive traits. Gays,
lesbians, and religious minorities, for example, might find it
relatively easy to conceal their group identities. Yet permitting such
discrimination would inflict a number of serious harms upon
those targeted.
Ultimately it is unclear why the wrongfulness of discrimination
should turn on whether a particular trait is mutable or immutable.
As Laurence Tribe has pointed out, “even if race or gender became
readily mutable by biomedical means, I would suppose that laws
burdening those who choose to remain Black or female would
30. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87.
31. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 150 (1980).
32. Yoshino, supra note 5, at 504; see also Janet Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics
of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability,” 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 509 (1994)
(observing that “the characteristics that define anonymous and diffuse groups are often
acutely mutable, especially when they can be hidden”).
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properly remain constitutionally suspect.”33 Here, again,
immutability seems at best indirectly relevant to the wrongfulness
of discriminatory legislation.
Another line of attack takes aim at the moral principle
underlying old immutability. Recall that, according to the Frontiero
Court, the immutability criterion protects individuals who are
blameless for possessing stigmatized, immutable traits.34 But what
about individuals who consciously choose to take on stigmatized
traits? As Jessica Clarke argues, the fairness principle in Frontiero
suggests that such individuals are to some extent morally culpable
for their own misfortune and so are not owed legal protection.35
Individuals who are responsible for possessing certain stigmatized
traits may choose “to dissemble about their status, conceal the trait,
or avoid seeking needed assistance,” lest they be subjected to
permissible discrimination.36 Yet this outcome seems likely only
to further stigmatize members of subordinate groups. Overall, by
focusing on the individual responsibility of victims of
discrimination, the old immutability criterion “deflect[s] attention
from questions about whether those in power have [legitimate]
reasons for imposing moralizing judgments on citizens
or employees.”37
C. From Old Immutability to New Immutability
Partly in response to the criticisms of old immutability, in a
number of post-Frontiero cases courts revised the immutability
criterion. The new immutability criterion focuses less on accidents
of birth, emphasizing instead the relationship between immutable
traits, personal identity, and individual liberty. New immutability
first gained judicial recognition in Watkins v. U.S. Army.38 At issue
in Watkins were new army regulations requiring the dismissal of all
homosexual personnel. The case was brought by former U.S. Army
Sergeant Perry J. Watkins, who had marked “yes” on a pre33. Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories,
89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1074 n.52 (1980).
34. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
35. See Clarke, supra note 7, at 17.
36. Clarke, supra note 7, at 21. Kenji Yoshino refers to this general problem as the
“assimilationist bias” of the immutability criterion. Yoshino, supra note 5, at 490.
37. Id. at 20.
38. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
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enrollment medical form in response to a question regarding
whether he had “homosexual tendencies.”39 Acting pursuant to the
new regulations, the army discharged Sergeant Watkins and
refused his reenlistment.
Watkins challenged the discharge and reenlistment regulations
as a violation of Equal Protection. According to Watkins, the
regulations invidiously discriminated against individuals on the
basis of sexual orientation.40 Moreover, he argued, because
homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the Army
regulations had to be submitted to strict scrutiny.41 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, finding for Watkins, declined to address
these claims, holding instead that the Army was equitably estopped
from refusing Watkins’ reenlistment.42
In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Norris takes up
Watkins’ Equal Protection arguments. In order to determine
whether homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class,
Judge Norris canvasses previous accounts of immutability and
concludes that “by ‘immutability’ the Court has never meant . . .
that members of the class must be physically unable to change
or mask the trait defining their class.”43 As Norris points out,
non-white individuals may “pass” as white or even undergo
pigment injections to effectively change their racial identity. Thus,
while race is the paradigm case of immutability, at least some traits
associated with race are, in fact, mutable. Similarly, Norris writes,
“[i]t may be that some heterosexuals and homosexuals can change
their sexual orientation through extensive therapy, neurosurgery or
shock treatment.”44 Norris’s point is that if immutability is
understood strictly, nothing is truly immutable, in which case the
immutability criterion is worthless.
However, Norris argues, the conception of immutability
contained in prior case law can be read in “a more capacious
manner” as having been based not on physical immutability,
strictly speaking, but upon the personal effects of changing certain

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
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deeply held traits.45 According to Norris, “immutability” refers to
“those traits that are so central to a person’s identity that it would
be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to
change them, regardless of how easy that change might be
physically.”46 Norris concludes that under this definition sexual
orientation is an immutable characteristic.47
Some evidence suggests that the Supreme Court has adopted
the new immutability criterion. For example, Kennedy’s majority
opinion in Obergefell begins with the claim that the Constitution
grants certain rights “that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to
define and express their identity.”48 For gay couples, Kennedy
claims, “their immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage” is
the only way to exercise this liberty.49 Here Kennedy ties
together liberty and privacy with the right to foster and maintain
certain core features of one’s personal identity, which are themes
familiar from Norris’s concurring opinion in Watkins. In light of
Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell, it seems plausible that new
immutability will constitute an important part of Equal Protection
doctrine going forward.
Nevertheless, many legal scholars remain critical of the
immutability criterion as a component of Equal Protection analysis.
First, while new immutability shifts the focus from unalterable,
physical traits to identity-related traits that are especially difficult
to change, new immutability still takes into account whether an
individual is responsible for possessing certain stigmatized traits.
Thus, new immutability calls for “the same moralizing judgments
as the old immutability.”50
A good example of this problem can be seen in Varnum v. Brien,
a pre-Obergefell gay marriage case.51 In Varnum, the Iowa Supreme
Court notes that the new immutability criterion allows for a
separation of “truly victimized individuals from those who
have invited discrimination by changing themselves so as to be

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
Id. at 2594.
See Clarke, supra note 7, at 34 (citation omitted).
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
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identified with the [stigmatized] group.”52 As Clarke rightly
points out, the Varnum holding requires “stigmatizing judgments
about who is ‘truly’ victimized, based on whether a victim
might have been able to change, hide, or downplay a
disfavored characteristic.”53 According to the reasoning in Varnum,
for example, a man who chooses to dress in traditionally
feminine attire and who faces discrimination on this basis is
not truly victimized, given that these aspects of his social
presentation are matters of choice. But this is hardly a defensible
result. Surely wrongful discrimination does not become
permissible simply because its target has chosen to be identified
with a stigmatized group.
New immutability also fails to protect individuals whose
stigmatized traits are inessential to their personal identity. For
example, Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Bowers v. Hardwick, notes
that “[h]omosexual orientation may well form part of the very
fiber of an individual’s personality.”54 For Blackmun, this meant
that the state could not punish homosexual individuals merely
because of their status as homosexuals. Yet some individuals may
be ambivalent or apathetic about the traits that supposedly form
the fiber of their personality.55 Some homosexual individuals,
for instance, might believe that their homosexuality is not essential
to their personal identity. Either the contemporary immutability
criterion does not protect these individuals, or the Court must
hold that, despite their protestations to the contrary, these
individuals are in fact defined by their traits. But this, too, is an
implausible result. Homophobic legislation presumably violates
Equal Protection regardless of the personal identities of its victims,
and individuals should not be forced to accept the Court’s
definition of their personal identity in order to receive protection
from wrongful discrimination.
Overall, new immutability fails as a replacement for old
immutability. At the same time, however, it is difficult to ignore the
tension to which I alluded in the Introduction, namely, that while
52. Id. at 893.
53. See Clarke, supra note 7, at 35 (citation omitted).
54. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 202–03 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. See Clarke, supra note 7, at 41 (arguing that the immutability criterion fails to cover
traits “that individuals would prefer to disclaim as constitutive of their authentic selves, and
those traits that individuals would prefer to change due to shame or stigma”).
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scholarly critiques of immutability continue to “fill volumes,”56 the
Court’s actual uses of the immutability criterion have been, on the
whole, broadly defensible. Employing the immutability criterion,
the Court has expanded Equal Protection doctrine to include
women, gays and lesbians, and individuals facing discrimination
on the basis of national origin, alienage, and illegitimacy. Few
critics of immutability take issue with this expansion of the
doctrine; presumably critics of immutability would agree that
affording heightened legal protection to these groups reflects a
proper understanding of the moral principles underlying Equal
Protection. For critics of immutability, then, while immutability is
conceptually incoherent, the Court nevertheless managed to guide
the doctrine in roughly the right direction.
I draw a different lesson from the academic criticisms surveyed
above. In my view, it is no accident that the Court was drawn to the
concept of immutability. The Court was so drawn because the
concept of immutability roughly captures an important truth about
systemic discrimination, namely, that discrimination most often
targets individuals on the basis of widely recognized traits that are,
in some sense, difficult to change. Thus, what the academic
criticisms surveyed above reveal is not that the immutability
criterion should be abandoned but that the Court’s immutability
analysis requires a better empirical account of trait-based
discrimination and a more plausible normative justification for the
immutability criterion as a component of Equal Protection. I take
up these desiderata in the following Part.
II. SOCIAL IMMUTABILITY
In this Part I present a new conception of immutability, which I
call “social immutability.” In Section II.A, I set forth the empirical
work that underlies my account of trait-based discrimination.
In Section II.B, I discuss the normative justification for the
immutability criterion as a component of Equal Protection. And in
Section II.C, I introduce the social immutability criterion. First,
though, I must be clear about the concepts and terminology used
throughout the rest of the Article. Equal Protection jurisprudence
is replete with references to immutable “traits” and
56. See Richard Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimination
Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1381, 1418–19 (2014).
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“characteristics,”57 terms often understood as referring to settled
features of individuals that are in some sense biologically or
psychologically fixed.58 However, I aim to defend a conception of
immutability that is agnostic with regard to individual biology and
psychology. To avoid the scientific connotations of “trait” and
“characteristic” I shall therefore use the term “social signifier.”
I define a social signifier as any observable property or relation
in which the individual is involved and which is commonly used
to sort individuals into groups. The function of a social signifier, as
I am defining the concept, is to convey information about the
various social groups to which an individual belongs. The groups
to which an individual belongs comprise that individual’s
social identity.
Social signifiers may be visible characteristics of the body, such
as skin color or hair texture. But social signifiers acquire their
meaning as a matter of intersubjective recognition, and so a variety
of properties and relations can come to be associated with different
social groups. Social signifiers may comprise properties or relations
such as speech patterns,59 names,60 addresses,61 and much else.62

57. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (asserting that “sex, like
race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic”); see also City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (noting that “many immutable characteristics, such as height or blindness, are valid
bases of governmental action and classifications under a variety of circumstances”); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (considering whether “undocumented status” is “an absolutely
immutable characteristic”).
58. Merriam-Webster, for example, includes the following definition: “Trait. (n.d.).
1.a: a distinguishing quality (as of personal character) curiosity is one of her notable traits; b:
an inherited characteristic.” Trait, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY,
UNABRIDGED (3d ed. 2018).
59. See Benjamin Munson & Molly Babel, Loose Lips and Silver Tongues, or, Projecting
Sexual Orientation Through Speech, 1 LANGUAGE & LINGUISTICS COMPASS 416, 420 (2007)
(reviewing studies on perceived differences between gay, lesbian, and straight patterns of
speech, the authors note the “growing consensus in the fields of laboratory phonology,
psycholinguistics, and sociolinguistics that individuals invoke social expectations and social
stereotypes when processing language”).
60. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV.
991, 998 (2004) (demonstrating that fictitious job applicants given first names typically
associated with Blacks receive fewer employer callbacks than fictitious job applicants given
first names typically associated with whites).
61. Id. at 1003.
62. See infra Part IV.
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Social signifiers convey information about the status of the
social groups to which the individual belongs. Broadly speaking,
the predominant social beliefs about various groups can be
expected to take the following form: members of low-status social
groups will be stereotyped as characteristically possessing vices,
disabilities, dispositions to act in morally discreditable ways, or
other social deficiencies.63 Members of high-status social groups
will be stereotyped as characteristically possessing virtues,
capabilities, dispositions to act in morally creditable ways, or other
social competencies.64 Social signifiers associated with particular
groups will then take on the moral valence of the stereotypical
characteristics associated with that group.65
With this understanding of social signifiers in mind, it is
possible to distinguish broadly between two types of wrongful
discrimination.66 The first type consists of bare hostility towards

63. Susan T. Fiske, Amy J. C. Cuddy, Peter Glick & Jun Xu A model of (Often Mixed)
Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and
Competition, in SOCIAL COGNITION 78 (2018) (reviewing literature demonstrating that low
status groups are typically viewed as “openly parasitic (i.e., opportunistic, freeloading,
exploitative)” as well as “hostile and indolent”).
64. See Peter A. Caprariello, Amy J.C. Cuddy, & Susan T. Fiske, Social Structure Shapes
Cultural Stereotypes and Emotions: A Causal Test of the Stereotype Content Model,
12 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 147 (2009) (providing an overview of studies
demonstrating that members of high-status groups tend to be stereotyped as possessing
above average competence).
65. Note that the same characteristic can be differently valenced depending upon the
social identity of the individual taken to bear the characteristic. White male executives who
displayed anger were afforded higher status or salary relative to white male executives who
did not, whereas Black male executives were more likely to be rewarded for displaying
characteristics associated with warmth. See Robert Livingston & Nicholas Pearce, The TeddyBear Effect: Does Having a Baby Face Benefit Black Chief Executive Officers?, 20 PSYCH. SCI. 1229,
1230 (2009). Likely this is because of the common stereotype associating Black facial features
with aggression and perceived aggression in Black men with violence. See Kurt Hugenberg
& Galen Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social Categorization: The Role of Prejudice and Facial Affect
in Race Categorization, 15 PSYCH. SCI. 342, 345 (2004) (concluding that “[w]hen [racially
ambiguous] faces were seen to display relatively hostile expressions (stereotypic of African
Americans), individuals high in prejudice tended to categorize them as African American”);
see also Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence:
Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 590, 591
(1976) (finding support for the hypothesis “that the threshold for labeling an act as violent is
lower when viewing a [B]lack committing the same act”).
66. To be clear, this is not meant to be an exhaustive account of the types of
discrimination individuals or groups may face. My account of discrimination focuses solely
on trait-based discrimination, as opposed to other forms, e.g., exclusion of minority groups
from the political process. I thank Scott Hershovitz for encouraging me to clarify this point.
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members of a particular group.67 The second type consists of
differential treatment of individuals who bear low-status social
signifiers. An employer, for example, might refuse to hire an
individual who bears a low-status social signifier, on the grounds
that the signifier reliably indicates (in the employer’s eyes) the
possession of morally discreditable characteristics that fail
meritocratic hiring criteria.
The introduction of the term “social signifier” marks
substantive differences between the social conception of
immutability and current doctrine. First, current doctrine assumes
that group boundaries simply fall out of natural differences in
biologically or psychologically fixed traits. However, distinctions
drawn between social groups often have no basis in the biological
or psychological study of human traits and characteristics. Even in
cases where a group boundary roughly tracks some empirically
determinate difference, the social meaning of the boundary is often
deeply conditioned by historical practices, material inequalities,
cultural norms, folk knowledge, etc.68
On my view, social signifiers possess a functional role in group
dynamics: they are used by dominant groups to reinforce social
boundaries. Importantly, social signifiers can perform this function
regardless of whether they are physically or psychologically
unchangeable. Indeed, the underlying nature of social signifiers is
irrelevant here. To maintain the boundaries between high- and lowstatus groups, it is simply necessary that either a sufficient number
of individuals associate a particular signifier with a particular social
group and believe that this signifier cannot be changed or that
members of low-status groups are unwilling to shed the signifier,
which is itself taken to be a morally discrediting fact about such
individuals. Ultimately, as the social psychologist Henri Tajfel
observes, “[t]he only ‘reality’ tests that matter with regard to group
67. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (arguing that “if the
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest”) (emphasis in original). I discuss
the relationship between the social conception of immutability and animus doctrine
in Section III.A.
68. As Charles Tilly notes with regard to gender boundaries, for instance, “[t]hey
correspond approximately to genetically based variations in physiology, yet they
incorporate long historical accumulations of belief and practice.” CHARLES TILLY, DURABLE
INEQUALITY 64 (1998).
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characteristics are tests of social reality.”69 In other words, social
signifiers and group boundaries will tend to be real to the extent
that individuals understand them to be real and to the extent that
individuals act on this understanding.
The second important difference between my account and
current doctrine is that on the current conception of immutability a
stigmatized characteristic is protected if it is fundamental to
personal identity. However, this conflates personal identity and
social identity. As I noted above, an individual who bears some
socially salient characteristic may judge that this characteristic is
not a fundamental part of their personal identity.70 This is because
personal identities are idiosyncratic and dependent upon an
individual’s self-understanding.71
By contrast, an individual’s social identity does not so depend
upon the individual’s self-understanding. Social identities are
ascriptive: if an individual is taken to meet the criteria for
membership within a particular social group, they will be identified
as a member of that group and will be treated according to the
relevant set of social norms, regardless of whether the individual
personally identifies as a member of this group.72
Social identities are constructed on the basis of widely
understood and relatively stable social judgments regarding the
signifiers typically associated with various social groups. Of course,
to say that these social judgments are widely understood is not to
say that they are widely shared; the meaning and status of a
signifier will likely be contested, particularly as subordinate groups

69. HENRI TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES: STUDIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 258 (1981).
70. See supra Section I.C.
71. Peggy A. Thoits & Lauren K. Virshup, Me’s and We’s: Forms and Functions of Social
Identities, in SELF AND IDENTITY: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES 106, 106–07 (Richard D. Ashmore &
Lee Jussim eds., 1997).
72. For a philosophical account of ascriptive social identities, see Kwame Anthony
Appiah, The State and the Shaping of Identity, 23 TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 241–
44 (2002). For classic sociological accounts of ascription in social relations, see RALPH LINTON,
THE STUDY OF MAN 113–31 (1936); PARSONS TALCOTT, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 41–42 (Routledge
2013) (1951); KINGSLEY DAVIS, HUMAN SOCIETY (1949); and Leon Mayhew, Ascription in
Modern Societies, 38 SOC. INQUIRY 105 (1968). For work on the connections between ascription,
status inequality, and identity formation, see Theodore D. Kemper, On the Nature and Purpose
of Ascription, 39 AM. SOC. REV. 844 (1974), and Mary Jane Collier & Milt Thomas, Cultural
Identity: An Interpretive Perspective, in THEORIES IN INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION 99
(Young Yun Kim & William B. Gudykunst eds., 1988).
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seek to overturn the negative connotations of the signifiers
associated with their group.73 As I argue in Section II.B, social
immutability targets caste hierarchies; thus, it is the social
judgments of dominant groups that merit scrutiny. For now, the
important point is that, for the social immutability criterion, it is
unnecessary for courts to examine an individual’s personal
identity. Instead, courts need only consider whether an individual
faced discrimination for bearing a signifier that is constitutive of or
associated with a low-status social identity.
A. Identity and Impermeability
In this Section, I discuss some empirical research concerning the
processes by which social identities are formed and group
hierarchies are maintained. It is important to present such work for
two reasons. First, having argued that immutability should not be
understood as referring to biological or psychological traits of
individuals, it is necessary to provide an account of what it is that
the immutability criterion should protect. The empirical work
introduced below is part of this account. Second, in
antidiscrimination cases litigators, advocates, and other interested
parties may frame their arguments around (their understanding of)
the Court’s immutability analysis.74 An empirical account of
signifiers and group hierarchy may thus help to inform the legal
and political strategies of parties seeking to expand Equal
Protection to new signifiers and to new social groups.
I begin with social identity theory, a theoretical framework for
explaining and predicting certain recurrent features of intergroup
status conflict. Social identity theory posits three psychological

73. See, e.g., Claud Anderson & Rue L. Cromwell, “Black Is Beautiful” and the Color
Preferences of Afro-American Youth, 46 J. NEGRO EDUC. 76–77 (1977) (describing the “Black is
Beautiful” slogan as an attempt to counter skin color discrimination by asserting a “positive
self-concept and self-acceptance for people of African descent in America”); see also
KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 106 (2007) (describing
the slogan “Gay is good” as performing a similar function for the gay rights movement).
74. See, e.g., Brief for Am. Psych. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (citations omitted) (“A number of researchers have found
familial patterns and biological correlates of adult homosexual orientation, suggesting that
genetic, congenital, or anatomical factors may contribute to its development. . . . The
scientific literature thus strongly indicates that sexual orientation is far from being a
voluntary choice.”). Though the Brief does not explicitly mention the immutability criterion,
such language is reminiscent of old immutability.
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processes that drive group formation and intergroup conflict:
categorization,
comparison,
and
identification.75
Social
categorization refers to the tendency of individuals to sort
themselves and others into groups on the basis of meaningful
criteria. Social categories are often constructed around visually
salient features of the human body.76 As I discuss below, social
categorization may take place regardless of whether these embodied
features are physically unchangeable.
The mere fact of categorization affects individual cognition and
behavior with regard to members of other groups.77 Once a social
category has been constructed and disseminated widely,
individuals tend to rely on these categories and their associated
signifiers, in some cases automatically, as cognitive shortcuts
for processing social information.78 For instance, individuals tend
to accentuate the perceived differences between groups or
categories;79 ingroup members tend to view outgroups as more
homogenous than the ingroup;80 and, ingroup members are

75. Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33 (William G. Austin & Stephen Worchel
eds., 1979). For meta-analytic reviews of the evidence supporting the key concepts of social
identity theory, see Naomi Ellemers, The Influence of Socio-Structural Variables on Identity
Management Strategies, 4 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCH. 27 (1993).; see also B. Ann Bettencourt et al.,
Status Differences and In-Group Bias: A Meta-Analytic Examination of the Effects of Status Stability,
Status Legitimacy, and Group Permeability, 127 PSYCH. BULL. 520 (2001).
76. See Charles Stangor, Laure Lynch, Changming Duan & Beth Glas, Categorization of
Individuals on the Basis of Multiple Social Features, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 207 (1992);
C. Douglas McCann, Thomas M. Ostrom, Linda K. Tyner & Mark L. Mitchell, Person
Perception in Heterogeneous Groups, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1449 (1985).
77. See Michael Billig & Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization and Similarity in Intergroup
Behaviour, 3 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 27 (1973).
78. See generally C. Neil Macrae & Galen Bodenhausen, Social Cognition: Categorical
Person Perception, 92 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 239 (2001).
79. Olivier Corneille, Olivier Klein, Sophie Lambert & Charles M. Judd, On the Role of
Familiarity with Units of Measurement in Categorical Accentuation: Tajfel and Wilkes (1963)
Revisited and Replicated, 13 PSYCH. SCI. 380 (2002); Joachim Krueger & Myron Rothbart,
Contrast and Accentuation Effects in Category Learning, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 651
(1990); Henri Tajfel & Alan L. Wilkes, Classification and Quantitative Judgement, 54 BRIT. J.
PSYCH. 101 (1963).
80. David De Cremer, Perceptions of Group Homogeneity as a Function of Social
Comparison: The Mediating Role of Group Identity, 20 CURRENT PSYCH. 138 (2001); Jennifer G.
Boldry, Lowell Gaertner & Jeff Quinn, Measuring the Measures: A Meta-Analytic Investigation
of the Measures of Outgroup Homogeneity, 10 GRP. PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 157 (2007).
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more willing to engage in cooperative behavior with and to expect
reciprocation from fellow ingroup members.81
In a status hierarchy, individuals will also form beliefs about
the moral character of members of outgroups. Members of highstatus groups, for example, will seek to attribute to members of
low-status social groups stereotypical characteristics that possess a
negative moral valence: vices, disabilities, dispositions to act in
morally discreditable ways, or other social deficiencies.82 When a
social signifier becomes associated with a low-status social group,
the signifier will also take on the negative moral valence of the
characteristics stereotypically attributed to this group.
Social comparison is the process by which social signifiers acquire
social meaning. As Tajfel argues, the status of social signifiers is a
result of intergroup comparisons: social signifiers associated with a
particular group “achieve most of their significance in relation to
perceived differences from other groups and the value connotation
of these differences.”83 In other words, social signifiers may have
no biological basis and may have little or no significance outside of
a particular social setting. Nevertheless, so long as individuals treat
them as indicative of significant group differences, social signifiers
will be no less real and no less meaningful for individuals than
other aspects of their environment.
Finally, social identification denotes “the extent to which people
define themselves (and are viewed by others) as members of a
certain social category.”84 Simply identifying as a member of a
group is sufficient to prompt discriminatory treatment of
outsiders.85 Individuals tend to overestimate the similarities
between themselves and fellow members of their groups, and
ingroup members tend to rate their own group higher on positive

81. Toshio Yamagishi & Toko Kiyonari, The Group as the Container of Generalized
Reciprocity, 63 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 116 (2000); Lowell Gaertner & Chester A. Insko, Intergroup
Discrimination in the Minimal Group Paradigm: Categorization, Reciprocation, or Fear?,
79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 77 (2000); DONALD KINDER & CINDY KAM, US AGAINST
THEM: ETHNOCENTRIC FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN OPINION 21–24 (2009).
82. See Fiske et al., supra note 63.
83. Henri Tajfel, Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour, 13 SOC. SCI. INFO. 65, 71 (1974).
84. See Ellemers, supra note 75, at 29.
85. See generally Billig & Tajfel, supra note 77.
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characteristics and lower on negative characteristics.86 By contrast,
ingroup members tend to believe that outgroups are relatively
homogenous, particularly with regard to characteristics
stereotypically associated with the outgroup.87 Likely these
phenomena are due, in part, to the fact that, beginning at a young
age, individuals tend to conceive of social groups in terms of
essences or “natural kinds,” particularly when members of an
outgroup are perceived as sharing the same visual signifiers.88
I note here one departure from social identity theory. According
to social identity theory, as originally conceived, a social identity is
a type of self-description. However, in what follows I shall focus
specifically on ascriptive social identities. As the anthropologist
Fredrik Barth observed in his classic study of ethnic group
boundaries, ascriptive social identities result from a process of
social labeling, whereby a social category is imposed upon a set of
individuals who (it is believed) possess a common set of signifiers.89
Crucially, it is not necessary that a particular individual endorse or
identify with the social identity she has been ascribed; rather, so

86. Jordan M. Robbins & Joachim I. Krueger, Social Projection to Ingroups and
Outgroups: A Review and Meta-Analysis, 9 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 32 (2005); Rupert
Brown, Social Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future Challenges, 30
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 745, 747 (2000) (citing a variety of studies, the author notes that “it is by
now a common-place that group members are prone to think that their own group (and its
products) are superior to other groups (and theirs), and to be rather ready behaviourally to
discriminate between them as well”).
87. See, e.g., Mark Rubin & Constantina Badea, Why Do People Perceive Ingroup
Homogeneity on Ingroup Traits and Outgroup Homogeneity on Outgroup Traits?, 33 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 31 (2007).
88. See, e.g., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP PERCEPTION: PERCEIVED VARIABILITY,
ENTITATIVITY, AND ESSENTIALISM 81 (Vincent Yzerbyt et al. eds., 2004) (reviewing literature
demonstrating that “[w]hen one or several perceptual cues point to the entitativity of a group
of people, perceivers are inclined to infer the presence of some essence shared by these
people” and that ”[a]s a result, they may often end up making strong assumptions about the
inductive potential and unalterability associated with group membership”); see also SUSAN
A. GELMAN, THE ESSENTIAL CHILD: ORIGINS OF ESSENTIALISM IN EVERYDAY THOUGHT 89–98
(2003) (discussing evidence demonstrating “that five-year-olds believe that not only race but
also a range of biological[,] though not psychological[,] properties are fixed at birth and
immutable over the life span” and that “[b]y late preschool, children reliably presume that
innate propensities shape race, language, and gender, suggesting that children may hold
nativist expectations about a broad range of phenomena”).
89. ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF CULTURE
DIFFERENCE 10 (Fredrik Barth ed., 1998).
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long as an ascriptive social identity is “intersubjectively widely
recognized” it will continue to shape social reality.90
Social categorization, social comparison, and social
identification are processes that characterize the formation of group
identities and their associated signifiers. To explain how these
processes affect intergroup dynamics, I will introduce one last piece
of terminology. Much work on intergroup conflict focuses on the
relative permeability of group boundaries—that is, the extent to
which individuals in a social system can move between groups.91
In order to maintain their dominant social position, high-status
groups will generally seek to maintain relatively impermeable
group boundaries. This is because when most members of a lowstatus group are barred from high-status groups or social positions
it is far more difficult for lower status groups to improve their
standing in the status hierarchy. Ascribing to others a low-status
social identity—especially a low-status ethnic, racial, or gender
identity—is a common method by which dominant groups
maintain impermeable group boundaries. As Barth puts it, such
identities are “superordinate to most other statuses, and define[]
the permissible constellations of statuses, or social personalities”
that low-status individuals may assume.92
To be sure, group boundaries will be absolutely impermeable
only in the most extreme caste hierarchies; in all other cases, there
will be varying degrees of individual mobility. Yet it is important
to note that permeability is not simply reducible to the number of
low-status individuals who are able to join higher status groups, for
even where individual mobility is possible, conditions of entry and
exit are often tied to a particular group’s position in the status
hierarchy. For instance, in hypergamous caste societies, women are
expected to raise their status by “marrying up” into a higher class
or caste but are generally forbidden from “marrying down.”93 In
other cases, entry into higher status groups is conditioned upon
hiding, downplaying, or shedding a signifier associated with a low90. RICHARD JENKINS, SOCIAL IDENTITY 154 (2004).
91. See generally Naomi Ellemers, Ad van Knippenberg & Henk Wilke, The Influence of
Permeability of Group Boundaries and Stability of Group Status on Strategies of Individual Mobility
and Social Change, 29 BRIT J. PSYCH. 233, 236 (1990).
92. ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES, supra note 89, at 17.
93. Louis Dumont, HOMO HIERARCHICUS: THE CASTE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
116–18 (Mark Sainsbury et al. trans., 1980).
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status identity.94 As these examples indicate, even when group
boundaries are permeable in some respects, they may nevertheless
serve to reinforce the subordinate position of low-status groups.
Note also that group boundaries often will exhibit a certain
symmetry with respect to high- and low-status individuals.
Relatively impermeable group boundaries function most obviously
to prevent low-status individuals from joining high-status groups.
However, in many cases higher status individuals will be generally
prevented from joining lower status groups as well. This is because,
for a status hierarchy based on ascriptive social identities to
operate, there must exist clearly demarcated signifiers that possess
separate meanings and separate statuses. Clearly demarcated
signifiers effectively identify who is to receive and who is to be
denied access to material goods and to high-status occupations,
roles, and relationships. When enough individuals adopt signifiers
associated with statuses or ascriptive identities different from their
own, the meaning or status of the signifier may become ambiguous
and thus ineffective for distinguishing between members of highand low-status groups. As I discuss below, it is for this reason that
Equal Protection immutability doctrine affords protection to
individuals from high-status groups who bear relatively lower
status signifiers.95
Overall, relatively impermeable group boundaries can be
successfully maintained when low-status individuals are ascribed
a social identity that possesses a uniformly low status across a
variety of social and political contexts. In order to ensure this
outcome, high-status groups can be expected to claim that certain
traits associated with low-status groups are immutable, regardless
of the underlying biological or psychological facts.96 Furthermore,
high-status groups will seek to ensure that these purportedly
immutable characteristics carry a negative moral valence. An
individual who bears these characteristics will be taken to possess
morally discreditable attributes and dispositions that can be

94. See Yoshino, supra note 5, at 490 (arguing that “courts [are] more likely to withhold
heightened scrutiny from groups that can change or conceal their defining trait”).
95. See infra Section IV.A.
96. For an example of this phenomenon, see Ramaswami Mahalingam, Essentialism,
Culture, and Power: Representations of Social Class, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES, 733, 742–45 (2003)
(discussing evidence indicating that members of dominant social groups in India conceive
of caste in essentialist terms, whereas members of low-status groups do not).
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invoked as grounds for denying the individual equal access to
high-status roles, occupations, and relationships.
The critical point is that members of high-status groups do not
need to possess an accurate understanding of human traits or
personal identity in order to exclude members of low-status
groups. To be sure, low-status social identities are often constructed
on the basis of signifiers that are physically difficult to change, such
as skin pigmentation and hair texture. By protecting signifiers that
are difficult to change, the contemporary immutability criterion is
thus broadly on target. But any signifier that is closely associated
with members of low-status groups and that, in relation to lowstatus individuals, possesses a negative moral valence, will suffice
for maintaining relatively impermeable social boundaries.
Any plausible conception of immutability must take this fact
into account.
B. Relational Equality and Equal Protection
In this Section, I turn to the normative basis of the immutability
criterion. As I noted above, the Frontiero Court’s concern for
individual responsibility fails to justify the immutability criterion:
presumably Equal Protection would still forbid discrimination on
the basis of race, even if an individual were to intentionally take on
the visible characteristics associated with a different race.97 In other
words, the normative principle introduced in Frontiero is effectively
at odds with one of the central purposes of the Equal Protection
clause, namely, eliminating racial discrimination in order to ensure
equal citizenship for Blacks and other subordinated groups.
A more plausible normative foundation for the immutability
criterion can be found by considering the history of Equal
Protection as a bulwark against the formation of caste hierarchies.
Throughout the nineteenth century, antislavery activists and
politicians regularly invoked the metaphor of caste to describe the
unequal status of racial groups within the United States.98 These
references to caste were not mere rhetorical flourishes but instead
represented a fairly sophisticated understanding of the mechanics
of group hierarchy and social group formation.
97. See supra Section I.C.
98. Scott Grinsell, “The Prejudice of Caste”: The Misreading of Justice Harlan and the
Ascendency of Anticlassification, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L., 317, 339–53 (2009).
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For example, in his public lecture, “The Question of Caste,”
Charles Sumner observes that caste hierarchies entrench
permanent inequalities of status.99 At the heart of a caste hierarchy,
Sumner argues, there lies a division of social groups into those who
receive “hereditary rank and privilege” and those who receive
“hereditary degradation and disability.”100 According to Sumner,
within the United States “the Caste claiming hereditary rank and
privilege is white; the Caste doomed to hereditary degradation
and disability is black or yellow, and it is gravely asserted that this
difference of color marks difference of race, which in itself justifies
the discrimination.”101 Though his language is reminiscent of the
biological conception of immutability that I considered above and
rejected, Sumner is identifying one of the key mechanisms by which
group status hierarchies are sustained over time: namely, the
association of subordinate groups with low-status social signifiers,
which are taken as grounds for discriminatory treatment. Other
discussions of caste, both before and after Sumner’s time, evince
a similar sophistication with regard to social signifiers and
caste hierarchy.102
Sumner’s observations suggest that a plausible normative
justification for the immutability criterion must directly address
the relationship between the imposition of legal burdens and the
processes that sustain status hierarchies. Recently, egalitarian
moral philosophers such as Elizabeth Anderson and Samuel
Scheffler have focused specifically on the nature of group status
hierarchy, and their analyses are instructive for the immutability
debate. For these “relational egalitarians,” equality comprises “a
kind of social relation between persons” and egalitarian justice
requires that all persons receive “an equality of authority, status, or
standing” with regard to important social relationships.103 On this
view, whether an individual or a group is regarded as an equal can
only be determined by looking at how the individual or group fares
across a wide range of social and political settings. This is so for two
99. CHARLES SUMNER, THE QUESTION OF CASTE: LECTURE (1869).
100. Id. at 10.
101. Id.
102. Grinsell, supra note 98, at 320. (characterizing 19th century discussions of caste as
a “richly articulated set of arguments about the nature of status-based harm”).
103. Elizabeth Anderson, The Fundamental Disagreement Between Luck Egalitarians and
Relational Egalitarians, 40 CAN. J. PHIL. 1 (2010) (internal citation omitted).
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reasons: first, what constitutes equal status will depend upon the
social norms and shared meanings within particular contexts, and,
second, an individual or group may receive equal treatment in one
setting but yet may be subject to degradation and other status
harms in other settings.
To be sure, relational egalitarians do not ignore the importance
of individual responsibility; relational egalitarians would agree
with the Frontiero Court’s insight that, in general, legal burdens
ought to bear some relationship to individual responsibility.
However, for relational egalitarians, the primary aim of just
political institutions is to ensure that individuals are regarded as
full and equal members of society. This requires first and foremost
the elimination of “social relationship[s] by which some people
dominate, exploit, marginalize, demean, and inflict violence upon
others.”104 The elimination of these relationships is required,
relational egalitarians argue, even when individuals bear some
responsibility for their own misfortune.105
Relational
egalitarian
arguments,
though
primarily
philosophical, are directly relevant to the immutability debate.
First, relational egalitarianism requires that individuals receive
protection from wrongful discrimination regardless of whether
they have chosen to adopt signifiers associated with low-status
groups. Adapting the language of Frontiero, a relational egalitarian
justification of the immutability criterion might run as follows:
irrespective of individual responsibility, legal burdens ought not be
such that they create or maintain socially immutable, low-status
social identities.
Relational egalitarianism also provides a coherent framework
for other aspects of the immutability criterion. For example,
because they view equality as a social relationship, relational
egalitarians recognize that a group’s social position is not simply
reducible to its share of political power or its control over material
resources and economic opportunities. Whether a group is
regarded as an equal depends upon whether the members of the
group are allowed equal access to a variety of status-conferring
social institutions, practices, occupations, and relationships.
104. See Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 313 (1999).
105. For relational egalitarians, just criminal punishment, which may carry a stigma, is
permissible, though even here there are limitations upon the extent to which a person may
be stigmatized for breaking the law.
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By comparison, consider Justice Scalia’s observation that gays
constitute a “politically powerful” group with a “high disposable
income,” and hence do not warrant the Court’s protection.106 While
accurate in some respects,107 Scalia’s argument overlooks the fact
that singling out a group for exclusion from a traditionally statusconferring social institution—such as marriage—plainly signals
that the group is of low standing. In fact, it is not uncommon for
low-status groups to possess certain circumscribed advantages
over high-status groups. For example, in late nineteenth-century
Germany Jewish individuals claimed an above-average share of
national income, and many individual Jews attained prominent
positions in social and political life.108 Nevertheless, German Jews
were excluded from Gentile dueling clubs, which were at the time
important status signifiers.109 Dueling “allow[ed] for people to
make claims to equality as individuals,” a claim that non-Jewish
Germans refused to recognize.110 The point is that the relative status
of a group can only be determined by looking closely at a range of
status-conferring practices, norms, and institutions, which is just
what the social immutability criterion requires.
Finally, relational egalitarianism provides support for
expressivist aspects of Equal Protection doctrine. Broadly speaking,
expressivist accounts of law hold that, in addition to their
regulative functions, laws also may express commonly understood,
public meanings.111 The public meaning of a law may be inferable
from the writings, statements, intentions, or other actions of
legislators, but the public meaning of a law is not necessarily a
product of these actions. As a communal form of expression, the

106. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645, 648 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. Christopher Carpenter & Samuel Eppink, Does It Get Better? Recent Estimates of
Sexual Orientation and Earnings in the United States, 84 S. ECON. J. 426, 433–34 (2017) (finding
both that “gay men earn significantly higher wages than comparable heterosexual men” and
that “lesbians have significantly higher annual earnings than similarly situated heterosexual
women, conditional on full-time work”).
108. TILL VAN RAHDEN, JEWS AND OTHER GERMANS: CIVIL SOCIETY, RELIGIOUS
DIVERSITY, AND URBAN POLITICS IN BRESLAU, 1860–1925, 63 (Marcus Brainard trans., Univ. of
Wis. Press 2008).
109. See generally Mika LaVaque-Manty, Dueling for Equality: Masculine Honor and the
Modern Politics of Dignity, 34 POL. THEORY 715 (2006).
110. Id. at 716.
111. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law:
A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000).
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expressive content of a law can be ascertained only “in light of the
community’s other practices, its history, and shared meanings.”112
Social immutability is an expressivist view in two respects.
First, social immutability is concerned with ascriptive social
identities, which are constructed on the basis of widely understood
and relatively uniform social judgments regarding social signifiers
associated with particular groups. Relational egalitarian principles
thus cannot be put into practice without a clear understanding of
these social judgments. In order to eliminate hierarchies based on
race or gender, for example, it is necessary to first understand
which signifiers are publicly recognized as expressing a racial or
gender identity.
Second, it is to be expected that politically dominant groups will
seek to formalize their status judgments through law.113 Relational
egalitarianism thus requires courts to scrutinize legislation for
impermissible expressive content; that is, content which
“express[es] contempt, hostility, or inappropriate paternalism
toward racial, ethnic, gender, and certain other groups, or that
constitute[s] them as social inferiors or as a stigmatized or pariah
class.”114 When the Court ignores or overlooks the status judgments
expressed in law, dominant groups are able to use the authority of
the state to maintain relatively impermeable boundaries between
high- and low-status groups.115
C. The Social Immutability Criterion
I now turn to the social immutability criterion itself. A social
signifier satisfies the social immutability criterion when it meets
two conditions: first, the signifier is constitutive of or closely
associated with a low-status social identity; second, those who are
taken to bear the signifier generally face relatively greater obstacles
to joining high-status groups, taking on high-status social roles
and occupations, or acquiring the means necessary for obtaining
112. Id. at 1525.
113. See, e.g., infra Section IV.B.
114. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 111, at 1533.
115. Compare, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (asserting that if “the
enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority,”
then “it is . . . solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it”)
with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that separate facilities are
“inherently unequal”).
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higher status. Such obstacles include but are not limited to
wrongful discrimination, stigmatization, stereotyping, and other
forms of arbitrary bias.
To be sure, one might wonder whether, by focusing on ascribed,
low-status social identities as opposed to unchangeable human
traits, I have offered a theory of immutability as that term is
ordinarily understood. However, it is important to keep in mind
that “immutability” is a legal term of art, and, as such, departures
from ordinary usage may be warranted, particularly when such
departures serve a useful legal function. As Judge Norris observes
in Watkins, most human traits, including those associated with race
and gender, are changeable to some extent.116 Nevertheless, racial
and gender identities are longstanding means by which to sort
individuals into groups of differing social status. Indeed, in some
case, the social import of these identities, as well as of their
associated signifiers, has endured over centuries.117 It is this critical
fact about social hierarchy that the doctrine of immutability tracks.
The mere fact that the legal doctrine of immutability fails to track
the dictionary definition of “immutability” provides insufficient
grounds for depriving Equal Protection of an important framework
for understanding how ascribed identities reinforce unjust
status hierarchy.
In the next two Parts, I discuss some practical matters of
application. In Part III, I consider the relationship between social
immutability and existing antidiscrimination doctrine. To get a
sense of how the social immutability criterion would operate in
practice, I then demonstrate, in Part IV, that the social conception
of immutability resolves some ongoing problems within
antidiscrimination law.
III. SOCIAL IMMUTABILITY AND JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
Social immutability ties together three longstanding doctrines
within antidiscrimination law: (a) the Court’s hostility toward
legislation that evinces animus towards identifiable social groups;
(b) the Court’s hostility toward legislation that stigmatizes certain
social identities; and, (c) the Court’s endorsement of the authority
of Congress, under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, to
116. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring).
117. See infra Section IV.B.
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abolish the “badges and incidents” of slavery. Each of these
doctrines requires the Court to closely scrutinize legislation
targeting low-status social identities and social signifiers. To be
sure, each of these doctrines addresses low-status social identities
and social signifiers in a different fashion, each has its own political
and legal history, and each has its own source of Constitutional
authority. Regardless, the social conception of immutability
provides a conceptually unified account of these seemingly
disparate aspects of constitutional antidiscrimination law, which
suggests that social immutability is less a departure from and more
an extension of legal and normative principles immanent within
Equal Protection doctrine.
A. Animus
Animus has often been glossed as an illicit subjective intent—a
bare desire to harm118 or a “fit of spite.”119 Yet Akhil Amar and
Susannah Pollvogt have convincingly shown that the Court’s
animus jurisprudence is best understood as targeting public laws
that irrationally disadvantage particular groups based on their
social status, regardless of the subjective intent behind such laws.120
For example, according to Amar, a piece of legislation evinces
unconstitutional animus when it “singles out a named class of
persons for status-based disadvantage.”121 This was, Amar argues,
the constitutionally sound principle underlying Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion in Romer v. Evans, a case taking up an amendment
to the Colorado Constitution which preemptively overruled
attempts to grant “protected status” to gays, lesbians, and bisexual
individuals.122 As Amar rightly points out, Kennedy does not argue
that a hostile intent per se is unconstitutional; rather, Kennedy
holds that Equal Protection is violated because the Colorado

118. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (holding that “a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest”).
119. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95
MICH. L. REV. 203 (1996); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 887 (2012).
121. Amar, supra note 120, at 225.
122. Id.; Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–25.
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amendment constituted “a status-based enactment[,] . . . a
classification of persons undertaken for its own sake.”123
According to Pollvogt, explicitly singling out a particular group
is neither necessary nor sufficient for the Court to conclude that a
particular piece of legislation evinces unconstitutional animus.124
As Pollvogt argues, it is unclear that the anti-miscegenation law at
issue in Loving v. Virginia explicitly singled out Blacks as a group,
for the law as written applied equally to Blacks as well as to whites;
nevertheless, the Court correctly concluded that the law constituted
an expression of white supremacy.125 Loving suggests, then, that
explicitly singling out a social group is not a necessary component
of animus-based legislation.
Conversely, singling out may not be sufficient for a finding of
animus. For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
the Court states that legislation singling out the mentally disabled
is not inherently unconstitutional, for such legislation often
“reflects the real and undeniable differences between the [mentally
disabled] and others.”126 The problem instead was that the
Cleburne City Council had failed to demonstrate the existence of a
rational relationship between the trait of mental disability and the
zoning ordinance at issue, which suggested to the Court that the
ordinance in fact rested upon “vague generalizations”127 about and
“irrational prejudice[s]”128 toward the mentally disabled.
The unifying principle behind Romer, Cleburne, and other
animus cases is that unconstitutional animus exists when public
laws arbitrarily “create and enforce distinctions between social
groups—that is, groups of persons identified by status rather than
conduct.”129 As the Court has recognized, while the specific
motivation for drawing such distinctions may vary, in all such cases
low-status groups are arbitrarily targeted on the basis of their social
identities or on the basis of signifiers with which they are
associated. Animus doctrine and the social conception of
immutability thus share the same foundational insight, which is
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Amar, supra note 120, at 227 (citation omitted).
Pollvogt, supra note 120, at 925–26.
Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)).
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 444 (1985).
Id. at 465 (Marshall, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 450.
See Pollvogt, supra note 125, at 926.
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that low-status signifiers associated with subordinated groups are
often regarded—due to prejudice, stereotyping, unsubstantiated
fear, and other forms of arbitrary bias—as proxies for morally
condemnable conduct. Moreover, both animus doctrine and the
social conception of immutability recognize that the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids legislation that enshrines such biases in law.
B. Stigma
While Cleburne is typically read as an animus case, Justice
Marshall observes in his concurring opinion that animus is often
directed towards stigmatized social groups.130 Though Marshall
does not draw the connection, animus jurisprudence arguably
shares much conceptual and sociological overlap with another area
of Equal Protection, namely, the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment
stigma jurisprudence. The Court has acknowledged that a concern
for stigmatic racial harm is central to the Fourteenth Amendment.131
Notably, the Court has extended stigma doctrine to reach cases of
sex discrimination, drawing explicitly upon cases involving racially
stigmatic harm,132 as well as to sexual orientation discrimination.133
Most recently, for instance, in Obergefell, Justice Kennedy points out
that legislation banning same sex marriage will result in “children
suffer[ing] the stigma of knowing their families are somehow
lesser,”134 an echo of the “Doll Test” famously cited in Brown.135
While the Court has not always been clear as to what constitutes
a legislative imposition of stigma, the general thrust of the doctrine
is clear: a law imposes stigma when it demeans, degrades, or
otherwise marks as possessing inherently low-status a particular
social identity.136 Thus, both stigma jurisprudence and the social
130. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 466 (Marshall, J., concurring in part).
131. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 408–10 (1991) (noting that stigmatic harm arising
from racial discrimination “reflects the central concern of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
132. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984).
133. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
134. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
135. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 n.11 (1954).
136. The locus classicus for work on stigma is, of course, ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA:
NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 3 (Simon & Schuster 2009) (1963) (defining
stigma as “an attribute that is deeply discrediting”). But legal scholars differ over how to
apply Goffman’s insights to legal doctrine. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1976) (describing stigma as a type of
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conception of immutability recognize that dominant groups will
seek to maintain their position in the status hierarchy by marking
certain social identities as inherently inferior. Yet, as the Court has
long recognized, the existence of an underclass of stigmatized
social identities is incompatible with the egalitarian promise of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Overall, this suggests that the Court’s
stigma jurisprudence and the social conception of immutability
draw upon the same empirical and normative framework.
C. The Badges of Slavery
The social conception of immutability also has a foot planted in
Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence. While there is a long history
of understanding Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment as
granting Congress the power to abolish the “badges of slavery” in
the United States,137 only recently has the meaning of this phrase
been brought to light. According to George Rutherglen, for
example, a “badge of slavery” generally referred to the fact that
“[f]rom certain external features, an individual’s social position
could be inferred.”138 Within the American antislavery movement,
“badge of slavery” was used more specifically to refer to the fact
that Black skin color was publicly and widely associated with
subordinate political status.139 After the ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment, this phrase was transformed into a term of
art referring more narrowly to postbellum legal restrictions placed
upon Black citizens.140
“psychological injury”); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 249–74
(1983) (describing stigma as arising from a “breakdown of empathy,” causing low-status
individuals to be “set apart and treated as not quite fully human”); Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317,
351 (1987) (arguing that “[t]he injury of stigmatization consists of forcing the injured
individual to wear a badge or symbol that degrades him in the eyes of society”);
R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
803, 891 (2004) (focusing specifically on “the negative citizenship effects of racial stigma”).
137. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 21 (1883).
138. See George A. Rutherglen, The Badges and Incidents of Slavery and the Power of
Congress to Enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 163, 166 (Alexander Tsesis ed.,
2010).
139. Id.at 165.
140. Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 561, 575 (2012) (asserting that the phrases’s “meaning appeared to evolve from the
antebellum to postbellum eras, particularly as it migrated from colloquial to legal use”).
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The social conception of immutability and the “badges of
slavery” understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment presuppose
that status hierarchies operate by associating certain social groups
with observable and widely understood low-status signifiers.
Consider, for example, that nineteenth century usages of the phrase
“badges of slavery” referred to observable signifiers, such as skin
color or hair texture, commonly associated with different racial
groups, as well as to postbellum laws targeting Blacks.141 The
badges metaphor thus referred to an observable property or
relation (in this case, a legal relation) used to sort individuals into
racial groups and to convey information about the relative status of
these groups.
On my account, then, while the social conception of
immutability falls under a Fourteenth Amendment heading, it is
nevertheless closely related to the “badges of slavery” component
of the Thirteenth Amendment. This is a welcome result given that
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are both based on a
principle of Equal Protection.142 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, for
example, enacted shortly after the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment, promised to all the “full and equal benefit of all
laws.”143 Doubts about the constitutionality of the Act under the
Thirteenth Amendment led to the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which, by affording to all citizens “the equal
protection of the laws,” incorporated and expanded upon the Equal
Protection principles contained within the 1866 Act.144

141. As Senator Lyman Trumbull argued in defense of the constitutionality of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, “any statute which is not equal to all . . . is, in fact, a badge of servitude
which, by the Constitution, is prohibited.” See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
142. Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 200
(1951) (demonstrating that “[a]t the very foundation of the system constructed out of the
Thirteenth Amendment and the Freedmen’s Bureau and Civil Rights Bills is an idea of ‘equal
protection’”); see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 48 (1986) (noting that “Republicans believed that the
Thirteenth Amendment effectively overruled Dred Scott so that Blacks were entitled to all
rights of citizens”).
143. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (1968)).
144. See CURTIS, supra note 142, at 103 (noting that, while most Republicans denied that
the Act and the 14th Amendment were identical, “[i]t is clear that the amendment
incorporated the principles of the bill”).

310

275

In Defense of Immutability

Given their historical backgrounds and shared normative
principle, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are best
read in conjunction.145 And this is just what the social conception of
immutability implies. The social conception of immutability joins
the normative principle of Equal Protection with a generalized
account of status hierarchies and social signification. Thus, though
it is intended primarily as a Fourteenth Amendment doctrine,
social immutability draws constitutional authority from the
Thirteenth Amendment as well. At the same time, it helps to
explain the close connection between the two amendments.
D. Conclusion
My aim in this Part was to show that the insights and principles
underlying social immutability appear in roughly similar form
throughout constitutional antidiscrimination law. No doubt my
analysis has glossed over many significant differences between the
cases and doctrines surveyed above. Offhand, animus doctrine
seems best suited for merely occasional instances of legislative bias,
as in Moreno, and for legislation that arbitrarily targets groups of
individuals who evince genuine differences, as in Cleburne. Stigma
doctrine seems better suited for legislative attempts to more
permanently affix a low status to particular social identities, as was
the case in Obergefell. Finally, a badges of slavery analysis may be
particularly relevant for addressing public and private practices
that subordinate individuals on the basis of race. But the
important point is that some of the main insights of the social
conception of immutability are already present within existing
Equal Protection doctrine.
IV. APPLICATIONS
In this Part, I show how the social conception of immutability
can guide Equal Protection doctrine moving forward. The
argument here is that by adopting a principled agnosticism with
regard to the underlying nature of protected signifiers, the social
145. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 157 n.180 (1992) (arguing that “doctrinal rules implementing the
Fourteenth Amendment’s basic principles must be sensitively crafted in light of Thirteenth
Amendment principles” and that “[n]either Amendment ‘trumps’ the other; rather they
must be synthesized into a coherent doctrinal whole”).
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conception of immutability extends antidiscrimination protection
to signifiers associated with gender identity, culture, and ethnicity.
A. Gender Identity and Expression
Over the last two decades, Equal Protection principles have
expanded to include gays and lesbians within the scope of those
protected under antidiscrimination law. The same cannot be said,
however, for transgender individuals, despite the fact that
transgender individuals face widespread public and private
discrimination.146 Seeking to build on the legal victories won by
gays and lesbians, some transgender activists have argued that
gender identity satisfies the contemporary immutability
criterion.147 Other transgender advocates worry, however, that the
immutability argument will fail to advance transgender rights, for
it may be the case that some identities or practices that fall under
the transgender heading reflect individual choice.148 But
acknowledging that at least some aspects of transgender identity or
expression are (to some extent) a matter of choice risks
undermining the immutability argument, both in the courtroom
and in the public sphere.
Social immutability opens up a promising source of legal
protection for transgender individuals. Social immutability depicts
transgender discrimination as a form of caste-preserving, social
boundary enforcement. Transgender individuals—particularly
those who are publicly visible as such—threaten to undermine the
traditionally rigid distinction between masculine and feminine
146. See generally JAIME M. GRANT, LISA A. MOTTET & JUSTIN TANIS, NAT’L GAY &
LESBIAN TASK FORCE & NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY (2011); Kevin M. Barry,
Brian Farrell, Jennifer L. Levi & Neelima Vanguri, A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People
and the Equal Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507, 526–40 (2016) (providing an overview of
Congressional exclusions of transgender individuals from various antidiscrimination laws).
147. Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms Under the Transgender Umbrella, in TRANSGENDER
RIGHTS 16 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006) (noting that “the litigation strategies of
transgender rights advocates are very much informed by the legacies of the civil rights
movement . . . especially in the emphasis on immutability”).
148. Heidi M. Levitt & Maria R. Ippolito, Being Transgender: The Experience of
Transgender Identity Development, 61 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 1727, 1754 (2014) (a study of
transgender identity development concluding that transgender identity and expression may
reflect “highly individualized choices in relation to available resources as well as the benefits
and dangers . . . within social contexts at hand”); see also Currah, supra note 147, at 18 (noting
the potential of “construct[ing] gender as a choice in legal arguments”).
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gender signifiers. It is for this reason that gender boundary
enforcement measures often focus on gender presentation in public
spaces. For instance, a number of nineteenth century laws made it
a crime for an individual to appear in public in “dress not belonging
to his or her sex.”149 Though no longer formally regulated to this
extent, gender boundaries are often informally enforced in public
spaces, particularly through verbal harassment or physical violence
directed towards individuals who are perceived as deviating from
the traditional sex-gender system.150
According to the social conception of immutability, whether
individual choice is involved in any aspect of sex or gender is
irrelevant. In fact, social immutability does not purport to explain
how or why an individual comes to personally identify one way or
another. The social conception of immutability instead attempts to
identify and explain cases in which individuals are generally
prevented from crossing social boundaries, where those crossings
threaten existing social hierarchies.151 The relevant inquiries thus
concern, first, whether an individual is arbitrarily discriminated
against on the basis of a signifier that is associated with a low-status
149. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF
27 (1999).
150. See generally Ki Namaste, Genderbashing: Sexuality, Gender, and the Regulation of
Public Space, 14 ENV’T & PLAN. D 221, 221 (1996) (discussing evidence of public assaults
motivated by “perceived transgression of normative sex-gender relations”). One
complication worth noting here is that gender boundaries are asymmetrically enforced, in
that transgender women seem to face far more hostility than transgender men. One plausible
explanation for this asymmetry is that, for many cisgender heterosexual men, homophobia
is used to police the boundaries of masculinity, such that any same-sex sexual contact throws
into serious doubt one’s masculine identity. Cisgender heterosexual men thus may fear that
they will be “tricked” into forming intimate relationships with opposite gender but samesex individuals. Sexual deception is often cited, for example, as the motivating factor behind
the murder of transgender women by cisgender heterosexual men. The infliction of brutal
violence upon transgender women, who are cast as “effeminate” and therefore deviant men,
serves as a means by which to reaffirm one’s masculinity. By contrast, this logic does not
obtain for cisgender heterosexual women, for it is the infliction of violence, and not samesex sexual contact, that is destabilizing to conventional feminine identity.
See generally Kristen Schilt & Laurel Westbrook, Doing Gender, Doing Heteronormativity:
“Gender Normals,” Transgender People, and the Social Maintenance of Heterosexuality, 23 GENDER
& SOC’Y 440 (2009).
151. For the sake of space, I must elide a more detailed analysis of hierarchy and social
boundaries accounting for the more specific differences between various social boundaries.
For example, transgender women, who move from a dominant to a subordinate status group,
seem to face more persecution than transgender men, but this is not true for whites who
attempt to pass as Black and tend to face derision but not persecution. Blacks who pass as
whites, however, face both.
THE CLOSET
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social identity and, second, whether those who are taken to bear the
signifier generally face discriminatory treatment in various social
and political domains.
Of course, one might argue that transgender discrimination
does not quite fit this mold. An individual who, say, transitions
from presenting as a woman to presenting as a man may face
discrimination not because he bears male signifiers per se but
simply because he bears gender signifiers that do not match his
assigned sex at birth. But here it is important to recall why the social
conception of immutability focuses on signifiers in the first place.
Clearly demarcated signifiers of masculinity and femininity are
required in order to maintain a gender hierarchy. According to the
social conception of immutability, however, Equal Protection
forbids arbitrary discrimination that reinforces unjust status
hierarchies, and this remains so regardless of the signifiers borne
by victims of discriminatory treatment.
The argument that social immutability extends to transgender
identity is further bolstered by recent developments in asylum law.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1956, an individual
is eligible for asylum if they are unwilling to return to their country
of origin due to a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.”152 The Act leaves undefined, however, what
constitutes membership in a “particular social group.” The Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) first defined “particular social
group” as “a group of persons all of whom share a common,
immutable characteristic.”153 While courts have not settled on a
uniform definition of “immutable characteristic” in the asylum
context, a few recent cases have come strikingly close to adopting
something like social immutability.
In Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, for instance, the Ninth Circuit
reviewed the BIA’s denial of asylum to Geovanni HernandezMontiel, a gay, transgender asylum seeker who testified to being
raped by Mexican police and “attacked with a knife by a group of
young men who called him names relating to his sexual
orientation.”154 An immigration judge denied Hernandez-Montiel’s

152. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
153. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
154. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000).
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request for asylum, arguing that because Hernandez-Montiel
“wears typical female clothing sometimes, and typical male
clothing other times, he cannot characterize his assumed female
persona as immutable or fundamental to his identity.”155 Upon
review, however, the Ninth Circuit rejected this reasoning. The
Ninth Circuit identified Hernandez-Montiel as belonging to a class
of “gay men with female sexual identities.”156 These men, the court
wrote, face persecution because they “outwardly manifest their
identities through characteristics traditionally associated with
women, such as feminine dress, long hair[,] and fingernails.”157 In
other words, in the Ninth Circuit’s view, gender signifiers, though
mutable, may nonetheless constitute fundamental parts of an
individual’s personal identity.158
Of course, the Hernandez-Montiel decision still relies on the
“personal identity” conception of immutability I rejected above.159
However, other circuit courts have begun to recognize, at least in
asylum cases, that individuals are often targeted for persecution on
the basis of an ascriptive social identity. The Second Circuit, for
example, has defined “particular social group” as a group
“comprised of individuals who possess some fundamental
characteristic in common which serves to distinguish them in the
eyes of a persecutor—or in the eyes of the outside world in
general.”160 Similarly, the Third Circuit has developed a doctrine of
“imputed membership in a social group” that explicitly includes
individuals who do not personally identify as homosexual but
who are socially identified as homosexual and persecuted on
these grounds.161 As one scholar has argued, transgender
individuals may be able to bring a claim under an “imputed
identity” standard.162
These recent developments in asylum law find direct support
from the social conception of immutability. Descriptively, the social
155. Id. at 1089 (internal citation omitted).
156. Id. at 1094.
157. Id.
158. See also Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2004).
159. See supra Section I.C.
160. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
161. Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 721 (3rd Cir. 2003).
162. See Joseph Landau, “Soft Immutability” and “Imputed Gay Identity”: Recent
Developments in Transgender and Sexual-Orientation-Based Asylum Law, 32 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 237 (2005).
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conception of immutability explains how mutable signifiers may be
fundamental to an ascribed, low-status social identity.
Normatively, the social conception of immutability extends legal
protection to individuals who face discrimination on the basis of
their imputed (which is to say, ascribed) identity. The Second
Circuit’s claim that certain social groups face persecution because
they share a “fundamental characteristic . . . in the eyes of the
outside world” nicely captures both the empirical and normative
dimensions of social immutability.163 And from the other direction,
litigators and scholars of asylum law have argued that these asylum
cases should inform Equal Protection.164 The social conception of
immutability provides a unified account of why antidiscrimination
law must extend to transgender individuals both in asylum law and
in constitutional Equal Protection law.
B. Hair
Social immutability also extends Equal Protection to signifiers
associated with particular racial groups, regardless of whether the
adoption and display of these signifiers is the result of individual
choice. This constitutes a departure from current doctrine,
according to which signifiers resulting from accidents of birth
denote race, which is protected under antidiscrimination law, while
signifiers resulting from individual choice denote ethnicity or
culture, which is not. This distinction, however, is implausible.
For example, in a number of cases Black employees have
challenged corporate grooming policies forbidding hairstyles, such
as cornrows or dreadlocks, commonly associated with Black
individuals. Plaintiffs typically claim that these policies place
undue burdens on individuals for adopting cultural practices
associated with their racial group.165 Renee Rogers, for instance,
163. Gomez, 947 F.2d at 664.
164. See Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender
Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 404–05
(2001) (arguing that Hernandez-Montiel “promises to provide a useful mode of analysis in a
wide range of sex- and sexual orientation-based claims, including those concerning . . .
violations of equal protection”); see also Landau, supra note 162; Anthony R. Enriquez,
Assuming Responsibility for Who You Are: The Right to Choose “Immutable” Identity
Characteristics, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 373 (2013).
165. For an incisive overview of hair discrimination caselaw, see Paulette M. Caldwell,
A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365. See also
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challenged American Airlines’ policy forbidding cornrows on the
grounds that cornrows are “reflective of cultural, historical essence
of the Black women in American society.”166 Similarly, Charles
Eatman, challenging a United Parcel Service policy forbidding
uncovered dreadlocks, claimed that his hair was an important
connection to “African identity and heritage.”167 Though
acknowledging that their hairstyles were in part due to choice, both
plaintiffs argued that burdening an individual on the basis of a
cultural signifier associated with race is effectively a form of
race-based discrimination.
Hair discrimination cases are generally resolved in favor of the
employer, and most of these cases follow a similar dialectic.
Defendant employer offers (what courts take to be) a legitimate
business rationale for their grooming policy, such as the need to
present a conventional, professional image. Courts tend to argue
that the forbidden hairstyles are commonly but not exclusively
adopted by or associated with Black individuals; hence, policies
forbidding these hairstyles are formally race neutral. And while
acknowledging that the hair of many Black individuals is
particularly well-suited for locked hairstyles, courts often assert
that, because adopting a particular hairstyle is a matter of
individual choice, hairstyles reflect culture, not race, and so are not
eligible for protection under antidiscrimination law.168
As a number of scholars have pointed out, these arguments do
not take into account the history of using hair texture to classify and
subordinate Black individuals. For example, Thomas Jefferson, in
his Notes on the State of Virginia, claimed that Blacks could never be
incorporated into the state due to their supposed “physical and
moral” differences, among which he included the absence of
“flowing hair.”169 Indeed, hair type, to a greater extent than skin
color, was often determinative of racial categorization.170 In the
1806 decision Hudgins v. Wrights, for instance, the Supreme Court
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title
VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010).
166. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231–32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
167. Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
168. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
169. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 145 (Frank Shuffelton ed.,
Penguin Books 1999) (1785).
170. ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 60–62
(1st ed. 1982).
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of Virginia asserted that a “woolly head of hair” was the
predominant “ingredient in the African constitution.”171
In light of this history, the judicial reasoning evident in hair
discrimination cases seems especially implausible. In Eatman, for
instance, Blacks constituted ninety-four percent of the employees
affected by UPS’s grooming policies.172 Various UPS managers
“told [Eatman] that he looked like an alien and like Stevie Wonder,
twice compared his hair to ‘shit,’ linked his hair to ‘extracurricular’
drug use, requested a pair of scissors (as if to cut off the locks), and
pulled his hair.”173 Nevertheless, the court held that these
comments were not racially discriminatory because they did not, in
the court’s view, mention Eatman’s race.174
To be sure, one might argue that courts have not overlooked
this history but are simply working within the constraints of
current Equal Protection doctrine, according to which mutable
characteristics are not protected. Curiously, however, courts have
repeatedly reaffirmed the holding of Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual
Hospital Insurance, according to which corporate grooming policies
forbidding “Afro” hairstyles could be considered racially
discriminatory.175 In this case, Beverly Jeanne Jenkins was denied a
promotion on the grounds that “[she] could never represent Blue
Cross with [her] Afro.”176 According to the majority opinion, “[a]
layperson[’]s description of racial discrimination could hardly be
more explicit. The reference to the Afro hairstyle was merely the
method by which the plaintiff’s supervisor allegedly expressed
the employer’s racial discrimination.”177
This is a puzzling result, given that one could offer the same
arguments in defense of corporate grooming policies forbidding
Afro hairstyles. After all, not all individuals racialized as Black
grow hair suitable for an Afro hairstyle, whereas some non-Black
individuals do. Moreover, growing and maintaining an Afro is to
some extent due to individual choice, given that an individual
could simply keep their hair closely cropped or shaved entirely.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
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Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 139 (1806).
Eatman, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 264.
Id.
Id.
Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
Id.
Id. at 168.
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Nevertheless, courts have repeatedly (and, in my view, correctly)
observed that policies forbidding Afro hairstyles support an
inference of racial discrimination, on the grounds that Afros are
immutable whereas locked hairstyles are not.
Why do courts seem to understand the connotations of an “Afro
ban” but not the connotations of a ban on locked hair styles? On my
reading, the real crux of the hair discrimination cases lies in the fact
that since at least the mid-1960s the Afro has been commonly
associated with a more self-consciously confrontational style of
Black political activism.178 Indeed, the association of the Afro with
militant Black political movements is widely accepted among
scholars of the subject.179 Consider that Jenkins was decided in 1976;
in this cultural moment, it would have been difficult to ignore the
connotations of a workplace policy forbidding Afros. By contrast,
locked hairstyles do not seem to have acquired the same
widespread political valence, at least among a (generally white)
judiciary. This partly explains why courts perceive the social
connotations of an Afro ban as opposed to the social connotations
of a ban on locked hairstyles.
Ultimately the logic in hair discrimination cases falters because
no hairstyle is immutable, strictly speaking. As Kobena Mercer
observes, all hairstyles rely on “artificial techniques to attain their
characteristic shapes and hence political significance.”180 Courts
should thus abandon the traditional immutability analysis and
consider directly the political significance of corporate
grooming policies.
It is important to be cautious here, however, since much
scholarship critical of hair discrimination urges courts to expand
antidiscrimination law to protect an individual’s self-conceived
ethnic, cultural, or racial identity. Camille Gear Rich, for example,
argues that plaintiffs like Charles Eatman are engaged in acts of
“race/ethnicity performance,” which she defines as “any behavior
or voluntarily displayed attribute which, by accident or design,

178. Robin D. G. Kelley, Nap Time: Historicizing the Afro, 1 FASHION THEORY 339, 339
(1997) (noting that “the Afro has clearly been the most powerful symbol of Black Power
style politics”).
179. Id. at 340 (observing that “the Afro’s long-standing association with post-1966
Black militancy has become ‘common sense’ in the world of hair scholarship”).
180. Kobena Mercer, Black Hair/Style Politics, in OUT THERE: MARGINALIZATION AND
CONTEMPORARY CULTURES 247, 256 (Russell Ferguson et al. eds., 1990).
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communicates racial or ethnic identity or status.”181 According to
Rich, the current conception of immutability “devalues the
psychological and dignitary interests that employees have in
race/ethnicity performance.”182
While sympathetic to such proposals, I believe that they face
two decisive objections. First, it is unnecessary for courts to
consider whether an individual is adopting or performing a
particular identity. This objection is similar to the objection raised
above against the personal identity conception of immutability: just
as a gay individual might not believe that their sexual orientation
is fundamental to their personal identity, it is likely that at least
some Black individuals adopt a locked hairstyle not because it is
essential to their ethnic, cultural or racial identity but out of, say,
aesthetic preference or simple convenience. Yet racial and cultural
identity models would deny protection to such individuals.183 This
outcome is implausible. Suppose that a Black individual “passing”
as white were “exposed” and then subjected to humiliating
treatment at work. Surely antidiscrimination law should afford this
individual relief, even though they had clearly refused to perform
their racial identity. As the social conception of immutability makes
clear, antidiscrimination law must protect individuals from
arbitrary discrimination regardless of how they personally relate to
their stigmatized signifiers.
Second, ethnic or cultural identity models require that courts
identify which aspects of a culture are essential to identity.
However, there are good reasons to be skeptical that courts can or
even should engage in this sort of inquiry. Cultures, especially in a
multicultural society, are dynamic and overlapping. It is unclear
how courts would decide which cultural phenomena belong to
which groups, especially given that social groups themselves often
internally disagree over what is essential to their group’s

181. Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and
the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1139 (2004); see also D. Wendy Greene, Splitting
Hairs: The Eleventh Circuit’s Take on Workplace Bans Against Black Women’s Natural Hair in
EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 987, 1035 (2017) (arguing
that for plaintiffs like Renee Rogers, “hair texture and the ways in which it grows and is
styled are central to their personhood as Black women”).
182. Rich, supra note 181, at 1141.
183. See id. at 1211.
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identity.184 Even if a consensus were to emerge, a court’s decision
to ratify certain cultural signifiers as expressive of an authentic
racial identity will “discredit anyone who does not fit the culture
style ascribed to her racial group.”185 At least one court has declined
to protect cultural signifiers for these reasons,186 and it seems
unlikely that other courts will be more inclined to wade into these
murky waters, especially given that courts have consistently
declined to engage in similar inquiries with regard to religious
beliefs and practices.187
On the social conception of immutability, signifiers constitutive
of or closely associated with stigmatized or subordinated social
identities, whether mutable or immutable, receive protection under
antidiscrimination law. To be sure, there will likely be cases in
which it is unclear that a signifier meets these criteria; thus, courts
must still inquire into how particular social identities are
constructed. However, with regard to hair discrimination, it is not
just that hair texture is associated with Black individuals; hair
texture has also been used historically and legally to construct
Blackness as a racial category.188 Thus, corporate grooming policies
and workplace behaviors that implicitly or explicitly demean
hairstyles associated with Black individuals thereby contribute to
the stigmatization of Black identity.189
184. Compare, e.g., YOSHINO, supra note 73, at 845 (drawing up a list of attributes
constitutive of gay culture) with FORD, supra note 11, at 71–72 (criticizing attempts, including
Yoshino’s, to “define group differences with sufficient formality as to produce a list of
traits at all”).
185. Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1811 (2000).
186. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d 1156, 1170–72 (11th Cir. 2016).
187. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (asserting that it is “not
within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith,
or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds”); see also United
States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (asserting an “overriding interest
in keeping the government . . . out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of
differing religious claims”); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 457
(1988) (asserting that it is not the Court’s role to find “that some sincerely held religious
beliefs and practices are not ‘central’ to certain religions, despite protestations to the contrary
from the religious objectors who brought the lawsuit”).
188. Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 139 (1806).
189. To be clear, my analysis is limited to corporate grooming policies that specifically
target hairstyles commonly associated with Black individuals. I do not address the more
difficult question of whether all corporate grooming policies that draw distinctions based on
social identities—such as gender-specific grooming policies—are impermissible. For a
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It is also important to distinguish my view from a similar view
defended by Richard Ford. Ford argues that bans on locked
hairstyles violate Title VII only when such bans are used by
employers as proxies for racial identity.190 Thus, he claims, if Renee
Rogers were able to demonstrate that American Airlines banned
cornrows in order to screen out Black women from the applicant
pool, then Rogers’ claim should be sustained. However, on Ford’s
view the same would be true if Rogers was able to demonstrate that
American Airlines banned, say, hoop earrings in order to screen out
Black women from the applicant pool, even if hoop earrings are not
generally associated with Black social identity. In both cases, Ford
argues, the grooming policy might constitute evidence of a
discriminatory intent, but the existence of a discriminatory intent
still must be proved in court.191 In the absence of an intent to
discriminate, he concludes, neither policy is objectionable.192
Though the conception of immutability that I have been
defending similarly forbids discrimination by proxy, the
differences between Ford’s view and mine are significant. Ford
introduces the notion of discrimination by proxy because, in his
view, bans on locked hairstyles do not themselves constitute
disparate treatment nor do they constitute wrongful disparate
impact. According to Ford, if a ban on mutable traits or behaviors
is to constitute disparate treatment, it must be shown that these
traits or behaviors are essential to a particular group’s identity,
“such that a workplace rule prohibiting the behavior or trait would
be illicit discrimination per se, just as a rule requiring that all
employees have fair skin would be racial discrimination per se.”193
Ford is highly skeptical, however, of claims that certain mutable
traits or behaviors are essential to racial group identity.194
Moreover, Ford argues, bans on locked hairstyles do not
constitute disparate impact, because such bans “do not deprive

critical discussion of this broader question, see ROBERT C. POST, K. ANTHONY APPIAH, JUDITH
BUTLER, THOMAS C. GREY & REVA B. SIEGEL, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF
AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW (2001).
190. See FORD, supra note 11, at 199.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 198.
193. Id. at 180.
194. Id. at 97–99.
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anyone of job opportunities.”195 Rather, Ford claims, such bans
merely disfavor employees who prefer “unconventional
hairstyles.”196 According to Ford, when faced with a ban on locked
hairstyles, “[p]resumably some will change their hairstyle in order
to get or keep the job.”197
While Ford is rightfully skeptical of claims that locked
hairstyles are essential to Black cultural identity, he fails to consider
that mutable signifiers can become part of a group’s social identity.
To see this point, consider Ford’s observation that, while a
grooming policy banning locked hairstyles might constitute
evidence of a discriminatory intent, a grooming policy banning or
disfavoring dark skin constitutes discrimination per se. Why would
this latter policy constitute discrimination per se? Ford’s approach
suggests that this policy is racially discriminatory per se because it
constitutes irrefutable evidence of a racially discriminatory intent.198
However, this might not be true in all cases. Suppose, for example,
that the employer is a newly arrived foreigner who is totally
unfamiliar with the American racial caste system. For this
employer, hiring employees with lighter skin, regardless of their
racial categorization, is important for projecting a conventional,
business-like image. Though this policy will disadvantage potential
employees who prefer not to engage in skin lightening treatments,
presumably some will change their skin tone in order to get or
keep the job.
Despite the absence of a racially discriminatory intent, this
policy would plainly constitute discrimination per se. What makes
the act discriminatory per se is not the intent, or lack thereof, but
the fact that the act targets a signifier that is constitutive of a lowstatus social identity. That is, even if an employer were entirely
unaware of the relationship between dark skin and American racial
categories, a policy disfavoring dark skin would inherently
stigmatize Black social identity because dark skin is partly

195. Id. at 185 (emphasis in original).
196. Id. at 139.
197. Id. at 199.
198. Id. at 180 (arguing that per se arguments, “if accepted . . . would make the claim of
discrimination irrefutable”).
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constitutive of Black social identity.199 This holds true even if some
individuals would change their skin tone in order to get or keep the
job, for the expressive meaning of the policy—that dark skin is
unconventional and unprofessional—plainly stigmatizes Black
social identity, regardless of the employer’s intent.
But once this point is acknowledged the inquiry turns to
determining which signifiers are constitutive of the relevant social
identity. Given that, as we saw above, hair texture and hairstyle
have long been used to construct Blackness as a racial category, it
is hardly plausible to argue that policies disfavoring hairstyles
associated with Black individuals merely disfavor unconventional
and mutable cultural preferences. To be sure, my account takes on
board Ford’s insight regarding discrimination by proxy: intent is
relevant in cases where employers adopt idiosyncratic policies in
order to screen out protected social groups. My account differs
from Ford’s, however, in two important respects: first, in my view,
discrimination per se is not simply a matter of intent: it is also a
matter of the objective social meaning of policies that disfavor
signifiers constitutive of or closely associated with protected social
groups; second, because mutable signifiers can be used to define
particular social groups, policies that disfavor these signifiers
constitute discrimination per se. Thus, the social conception of
immutability provides support for the claim that workplace
grooming policies targeting hairstyles adopted by or associated
with Black individuals are discriminatory per se.
C. Language
In a number of cases, courts have held that the possession of a
foreign accent and the ability to speak multiple languages are
protected characteristics under antidiscrimination law, on the
grounds that patterns of speech often denote racial or ethnic
background. Yet language discrimination cases, like hair
discrimination cases, often follow a tortuous logic. In language
discrimination cases, courts have struggled to distinguish between
199. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 111
(3d ed. 2014) (describing the role of “[p]erceived differences in skin color” in the “definition
and understanding of racial categories”); see also Lionel K. McPherson, Black American Social
Identity and Its Blackness, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY AND RACE 369, 376
(Naomi Zack ed., 2016) (describing Black American social identity as arising from
“paradigmatic social dynamics [that] track visible African ancestry”).
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the immutable and mutable characteristics of language; to identify
the connections between language, ethnicity, and personal identity;
and to separate out legitimate language regulation from mere
arbitrary bias. As I shall argue in this Section, the results have been
scattershot and unconvincing.
The Supreme Court recognized nearly one century ago that
language can be used to identify and subordinate ethnic or cultural
outsiders. In the 1923 case Nebraska v. Meyer, the Court subtly
addressed the post-World War I, anti-German bias underlying the
state’s restrictions on foreign language instruction. In the Court’s
view, the desire to form a linguistically homogenous polity is
understandable, given the “[u]nfortunate experiences during the
late war and aversion toward every characteristic of truculent
adversaries.”200 However, the Court concluded, the chosen means
are impermissible because “[t]he protection of the Constitution
extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to
those born with English on the tongue.”201 These aspects of the case
suggest that Meyer, though most often read as a touchstone for
substantive due process rights,202 can plausibly also be read as an
early animus case, wherein language is targeted as a proxy for
national origin.
This reading of Meyer gains plausibility from another language
discrimination case close in time. In the 1926 case Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, the Court invalidated Act No. 2972 of the Philippine
Legislature—the so-called Chinese Bookkeeping Act.203 The Act
made it unlawful for any person or corporation engaged in
commercial activity in the Philippine Islands “to keep its account
books in any language other than English, Spanish, or any local
dialect.”204 The claimed purpose of the Act was to facilitate the
accurate tally and collection of a general sales tax. While the vast
majority of the 12,000 Chinese merchants to whom the tax applied
could neither read nor write in any of the local languages, violators
of the Act could be fined up to $5,000 and could be imprisoned for
up to two years.205
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
Id. at 401.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1509 (1999).
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 524–25 (1926).
Id. at 508.
Id. at 513–14, 518.
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The Court, citing Meyer, framed its holding in terms of
due process: in the Court’s view, the Act constituted an “oppressive
and arbitrary” infringement upon the liberty of the affected
Chinese merchants.206 However, just as in Meyer, there was a clear
Equal Protection issue at stake, which came out in the Court’s
analysis of the Act itself. Rejecting a number of alternate
constructions, some of which may have preserved the
constitutionality of the Act, the Court asserted that there was no
“doubt that the Act . . . was chiefly directed against the Chinese
merchants” and that the Act was “obviously intended chiefly to
affect [Chinese merchants] as distinguished from the rest of the
community.”207 On these grounds the Court declared the Act a
violation of Equal Protection.
In light of Meyer and Yu Cong Eng, there is ample precedent for
including language discrimination within antidiscrimination law,
and contemporary courts accept that speakers of foreign languages
deserve protection. Yet there is considerable disagreement over the
grounds for providing such protection. As one court noted recently,
“[t]hat minority language groups are vulnerable to majoritarian
politics is clear . . . [but] what is not yet clear is how best to
protect them.”208
Some courts have applied a conventional immutability
analysis. In Garcia v. Gloor, for instance, the Fifth Circuit considered
a Title VII challenge to an employer’s rule prohibiting bilingual
employees engaged in sales work from speaking Spanish on the
job.209 Finding in favor of the employer, the Court noted that “[t]o
a person who speaks only one tongue or to a person who has
difficulty using another language than the one spoken in his home,
language might well be an immutable characteristic like skin color,
sex or place of birth.”210 Yet the workplace regulation in question
applied only to bilingual employees, and, according to the Court,
“the language a person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a
particular time is by definition a matter of choice.”211 Thus, in the
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Court’s view the employer’s policy did not discriminate on the
basis of a protected characteristic.212
In other cases, courts have focused on the significance that
language often has for an individual’s personal identity. In
Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, for instance, the Ninth Circuit
considered a challenge to a municipal court policy forbidding
employees from speaking any language other than English, except
when acting as translators or during breaks or lunchtime.213
Holding that “English-only rules generally have an adverse impact
on protected groups and . . . should be closely scrutinized,” the
court argued that an individual’s primary language “remains an
important link to . . . ethnic culture and identity.”214 The Gutierrez
opinion, and others like it, invoke language familiar from the
personal identity conception of immutability I discussed above.215
Other courts, however, have avoided the immutability
question, reasoning instead that language is often a proxy for, if not
partly constitutive of, race or national origin. In Hernandez v. New
York, for example, the Supreme Court reviewed a New York state
prosecutor’s decision to exercise peremptory challenges to exclude
Spanish-speaking individuals from serving as jurors for a trial in
which Spanish language testimony would be central.216 Three of the
four excluded individuals were Hispanic; yet, the prosecutor
denied that he sought to exclude Hispanic individuals, maintaining
instead that he wished to exclude only individuals who “might
have difficulty in accepting the translator’s rendition of Spanishlanguage testimony,” a category that extended to Hispanics and
non-Hispanics alike.217
While deeming the prosecutor’s reasoning race-neutral, the
plurality opinions split over how to conceive of the connection
between language and race or national origin. Citing Meyer and Yu
Cong Eng, Justice Kennedy observed that “for certain ethnic groups
and in some communities . . . proficiency in a particular language,

212. Id. at 272.
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like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an
[E]qual [P]rotection analysis.”218 By contrast, according to Justice
O’Connor, “[n]o matter how closely tied or significantly correlated
to race the explanation for a peremptory strike may be, the strike
does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on
race.”219 For Justice O’Connor, a language-based peremptory
challenge would violate Equal Protection only if it served as a
pretext for racial discrimination.
Despite these differences, in most language cases the practical
upshot is the same: regardless of how they conceive of language
and the relationship between language and race or national origin,
courts tend to carefully scrutinize language-based regulations.
Since, in my view, this is as it should be, it may seem pedantic
to insist upon a clearer understanding of language for
antidiscrimination law. However, the persistence of such varied
and conflicting rationales is indicative of deeper flaws in
the doctrine.
First, attempts to distinguish between the immutable and
mutable aspects of language have led to implausible results. For
example, while the Garcia court argued that monolinguism is
immutable, this characteristic can be changed; for some
individuals, the change may be relatively easy.220 Second, though
there is no doubt that language can constitute a central part of an
individual’s ethnic identity, this is not true in every case. An
individual may decide to speak in their native tongue merely for
convenience, while a native English speaker who adopts a second
language may not identify as a member of the associated ethnic
group. Yet, if language ought to receive some form of protection
under antidiscrimination law, presumably such individuals ought
to receive protection. An employer who discriminates on the basis
of ethnicity should not be shielded from legal repercussions merely
because the victim does not identify with the relevant ethnic group.
Finally, while it may be unclear whether language is
constitutive of race or ethnicity, Justice O’Connor’s suggestion—
that no matter how closely language serves as a proxy for race,
language discrimination is not race discrimination—is untenable.
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As the Court properly recognized in Meyer and Yu Cong Eng,
language discrimination is often a form of racial or ethnic
discrimination. At the same time, however, it is plausible that some
workplace regulations restricting language choice reflect legitimate
business needs and that, when properly tailored, such regulations
neither express nor cater to racial or ethnic hostility. For instance, a
business might reasonably require that, when carrying out business
transactions, employees communicate in the language of the
business’s customers. The same cannot be said, however, for
workplace regulations that cater to customers who prefer to be
served only by same-race employees.
On my view, there is no need to shoehorn language into the
traditional immutability framework. What is needed for
antidiscrimination law is not an account of what language is but an
account of how language functions within status hierarchies. On
the social conception of immutability, language is of particular
interest as a social signifier because a spoken language, like hair
texture, skin color, and gender expression, is an easily observable
property that is often used by dominant groups to categorize and
subordinate minority groups. While Justice Kennedy is exactly
right to claim that language, in some cases, is akin to race or
ethnicity, this is not because of any intrinsic features of language
itself. It is instead because language, like skin color, is often used to
sort individuals into distinct social groups. The social conception
of immutability thus requires that language restrictions be
carefully scrutinized.
To some extent courts have already adopted this view.
For example, in Pemberthy v. Beyer, another case dealing with the
exclusion of Spanish-speaking jurors, the Third Circuit argued that
“[b]ecause language-speaking ability is so closely correlated with
ethnicity, a trial court must carefully assess the challenger’s actual
motivation even where the challenger asserts a rational reason to
discriminate based on language skills.”221 For the Pemberthy court,
“[t]he dispositive question is the factual question of subjective
intent.”222 For some scholars, the Pemberthy holding, though
imperfect, is sufficiently protective of linguistic minorities.
According to Andrew P. Averbach, for instance, “[a]lthough
221. Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 872 (3rd Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original).
222. Id.
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language minorities may face a difficult task in demonstrating
intent,” the holding in Pemberthy “affords them an opportunity to
challenge some of the most common (and often the most invidious)
types of language discrimination.”223
On my view, Pemberthy falls short in two respects. First, as I
have discussed in this Part, signifiers such as hair, dress, and
language are not only used as proxies for a particular social
identity; rather, they may be used to construct the identity itself.
Thus, there is no reason to require that plaintiffs prove the existence
of a discriminatory intent in addition to the intent to discriminate
against signifiers that are constitutive of a particular social identity.
This would be akin to requiring that plaintiffs prove the existence
of an intent to discriminate against Blacks in addition to an intent
to discriminate against Black skin. Second, requiring subordinate
groups to prove the existence of a discriminatory intent is both
unfair and bound to underprotect. Linguistic minorities, which are
often politically and socially isolated, are likely to be at a
disadvantage with regard to investigating economic and political
majorities. Moreover, given that, as various courts have recognized,
language discrimination has a long history in the United States,
there is more than enough reason to shift the evidentiary burden to
those who seek to impose language restrictions.
CONCLUSION
Overall, the social conception of immutability is able to explain
recent developments within the law and to provide a principled
basis for deciding future cases in a manner consistent with
historical Equal Protection principles. The basic insight of the social
conception of immutability is that immutability analysis should be
used to prevent dominant groups from constructing or relying
upon relatively fixed, stigmatized signifiers in order to maintain
socially impermeable group boundaries. For this purpose, the
biological or psychological traits, individual choices, and personal
identities of stigmatized individuals are normatively irrelevant.
The move away from focusing on individual choice and
personal identity is also important, given the demographic
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trajectory of American society. Consider Wendy Greene’s astute
observation:
[I]n light of increased immigration, cultural diversity, interracial
marriage, and transracial adoption, as well as the formal
recognition of multi-racial identity and more fluid selfcharacterizations of racial, ethnic, religious, and gender identity,
claims stemming from misperceptions about a plaintiff’s
protected status may become as commonplace as traditional
claims of discrimination based upon an individual’s self-classified
identity.224

Current political trends notwithstanding, it does seem likely
that future generations will increasingly be able to choose among a
panoply of racial, cultural, ethnic, and gender identities. Yet if
current immutability doctrine is retained, these choices will
undercut an important source of protection against discriminatory
treatment, thereby allowing impermeable group boundaries to
persist and caste hierarchy to endure. As I hope to have
demonstrated in this Article, however, the social conception of
immutability is a promising alternative.
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